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Presidential Politics and Judicial Review
David E. Adelman* & Robert L. Glicksman**
Abstract
This Article assesses the impact of judicial review on one of the nation’s foundational
environmental statutes, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Based on litigation
spanning fifteen years, we find that the stringency of judicial review is driven by the interaction
of judicial ideology and presidential politics. Our principal findings are two-fold: First, judicial
ideology, here defined by political party affiliation, is most influential when NEPA’s
environmental goals conflict with the politics of the presidential administration in power.
Second, the influence of judicial ideology is mediated by the distribution of cases across federal
circuits and the ideological balance of judges within them; specifically, the concentration of
NEPA cases in the Ninth Circuit, where liberal appellate judges are in the majority. Under welldefined conditions, we find that judicial review is most demanding when the risk of statutory
subversion is greatest—that is, when the politics of an administration conflict with the purpose of
the governing statute.
The normative and practical implications of these observations are illustrated by
comparing NEPA with the expanding array of legal mandates that prescribe elaborate economic
cost-benefit analyses. Most recently, the Trump Administration has issued a raft of executive
orders and Congress is considering new legislation that augment the economic reviews required
under existing laws and regulations. Understanding the interplay between presidential politics
and judicial review provides new grounds for concern that, unlike NEPA, the pending statutes
will seriously disrupt and delay agency decision-making processes. Further empirical study of
judicial review under a range of statutes is needed to determine how broadly our findings apply
to judicial review of agency action across the federal government.
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The actions of federal agencies are constrained by a mix of substantive and procedural
laws. Organic statutes specify the factors agencies are required or allowed to consider in making
decisions; administrative procedures are prescribed by the governing organic statute1 or the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).2 On occasion, Congress has supplemented the factors
agencies are required to consider and the procedures they must follow in cross-cutting statutes
applicable to all federal agencies. Concerns about agency bias or indifference towards issues
outside their areas of expertise have prompted passage of such statutes.3 Numerous presidential
executive orders beginning in the 1970s have augmented administrative procedures further with
requirements for a variety of economic cost-benefit analyses.4

1

See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d) (2012) (Clean Air Act).
5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (2012).
3
See, e.g., Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (requiring agencies to assess
the effects of federal regulatory actions on state, local, and tribal governments and the private sector); Small
Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act, Pub. L. No. 104-121, 100 Stat. 847 (1996) (requiring agencies to
consider the economic impact of their regulations on small businesses).
4
See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011) (cost-benefit analysis); Exec. Order No.
12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993) (same).
2
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The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) established the legal framework for this
form of enhanced administrative procedure.5 NEPA procedures forced reluctant agencies to
consider the adverse environmental effects of their decisions,6 and over time it has attained a
“quasi-constitutional status as one of the foundational laws of the modern administrative state.”7
This prominence has made NEPA a lightning rod for criticism that its procedures and associated
litigation needlessly increase costs and delays in agency programs.8 Yet, within a decade of its
passage, conservative legislators used NEPA as a template for procedural reforms built around
regulatory impact reviews.9 More recently, the Trump Administration has embraced this
approach in a slew of executive orders purportedly designed to reduce the costs of regulation,10
and Congress is working on parallel legislation that would dramatically expand the requirements
for regulatory impact reviews and the opportunities to challenge them in court.11 These
developments make NEPA a uniquely valuable subject for evaluating the impacts of augmented
administrative procedures and the influence of judicial review.
This Article presents an empirical study of NEPA litigation during the administrations of
President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama that refutes the most critical views of
the law. We find little evidence that litigation under NEPA is out of control or that NEPA
processes are overly burdensome. To the contrary, environmental reviews and procedures
5

DANIEL R. MANDELKER ET AL., NEPA LAW AND LITIGATION § 13:1 (2016 ed.) (describing how “[e]nvironmental
assessment is an American innovation that has spread worldwide); see also Mathew Cashmore et al., The Role and
Functioning of Environment Assessment: Theoretical Reflections Upon an Empirical Investigation of Causation, 88
J. ENVTL. MGMT. 1233, 1233 (2008) (describing NEPA as the model for statutes in more than a hundred countries).
6
NEPA requires any federal action with a potential to “significantly impact” the environment to be reviewed in an
environmental impact statement, which must include a detailed assessment of a proposed action’s environmental
impacts and potential alternatives that could reasonably mitigate them. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2012).
7
Bradley C. Karkkainen, Whither NEPA?, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 333, 333-34 (2004) (claiming that the duty to
prepare an EIS “is as fundamental to contemporary administrative practice as an agency’s duty under the APA to
provide notice and opportunity for public comment prior to issuing rules”); Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and
the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1039-40 (1997) (characterizing NEPA and the APA as
“framework” statutes whose “rather spare” provisions have generated a “common law of administrative procedure”);
Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 479 (2010).
8
See MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 5, § 11:2 (referring to those criticizing “the dangers of excessive zeal” in
NEPA’s enforcement). Others criticized NEPA as too weak, noting the absence of any substantive component to its
obligations. See, e.g., Joseph L. Sax, The (Unhappy) Truth About NEPA, 26 OKLA. L. REV. 239 (1973); see also
Matthew J. Lindstrom & Zachary A. Smith, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: JUDICIAL
MISCONSTRUCTION, LEGISLATIVE INDIFFERENCE, & EXECUTIVE NEGLECT (2002).
9
ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN & RICHARD E. LEVY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: AGENCY ACTION IN LEGAL CONTEXT 382 (2d
ed. 2015); SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK: RESTORING A PRAGMATIC
APPROACH 130 (2003) (arguing that economic impact analysis laws focus on “the potential deleterious effects of
[environmental] regulation on economic development and other important considerations”).
10
E.g., Exec. Order No. 13,771, Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339 (Feb. 3,
2017) (requiring reduction of costs from existing regulations as a prerequisite to issuance of new regulations); Exec.
Order No. 13,777, Enforcing the Regulatory Reform Agenda, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,285 (Mar. 1 2017) (requiring
evaluation of existing regulations to identify those that eliminate jobs, inhibit job creation, impose costs that exceed
benefits, or are inconsistent with regulatory reform initiatives); Exec. Order No. 13,789, Identifying and Reducing
Tax Regulatory Burdens, 82 Fed. Reg. 19,317 (Apr. 21, 2017) (requiring review of significant tax regulations that
impose an undue financial burden on United States taxpayers, add undue complexity to the Federal tax laws, or
exceed the statutory authority of the Internal Revenue Service).
11
See, e.g., The Regulatory Accountability Act, S. 951, 115 th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(3) (to be codified at 5 U.S.C. §
553(b), (f)(1)).
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conducted under NEPA are typically circumscribed and rarely challenged in court. Roughly 99
percent of the many thousands of federal actions with potentially significant environmental
impacts are covered either by categorical exclusions to NEPA procedures or by environmental
assessments, which are typically much shorter than environmental impact statements (EISs).12
By contrast, yearly completions of detailed EISs now consistently fall below 200 nationally.13 To
put this in perspective, on average fewer than 100 NEPA cases are filed in district court annually,
roughly half of which involve challenges to EISs. A tiny fraction of environmental reviews under
NEPA therefore either require detailed EISs or are subject to judicial challenges that have the
potential to cause significant delays in federal programs.
Studying litigation under NEPA provides insights into the potential variation in NEPA
compliance across federal agencies and the impact of judicial review. At minimum, litigation
highlights the issues and agencies that receive the most public attention, the ways in which
NEPA procedures tend to fall short, and the procedures that provide stakeholders with effective
mechanisms for challenging federal action. NEPA litigation, in part because it involves
challenges that do not arise under an agency’s organic statute, also provides a less deferential
context for assessing the impacts of judicial review and the influence of judicial ideology on case
outcomes.14 Further, by extending the study over two presidential administrations with starkly
different environmental agendas, we are able to evaluate how NEPA litigation and judicial
review change in response to shifts in executive branch policies.
Our data reveal striking disparities in the number of NEPA cases filed against federal
agencies, the geographic distribution of cases across circuits, and the types of plaintiffs. While
one would not expect NEPA litigation to be evenly spread across federal agencies given their
divergent missions, we find that two-thirds of NEPA cases were filed against just five agencies,
each of which either manages federal lands or has principal authority over protecting natural
resources.15 Notably absent from this list are agencies that fund or permit major infrastructure,
such as the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), and agencies with authority over major
federal facilities, such as the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy. The
geographic distribution of NEPA litigation is also skewed, with roughly 50 percent of the district
court and circuit cases filed in the Ninth Circuit alone and another 25 percent in the D.C., Sixth,
and Tenth Circuits.
For most agencies in most states, the patterns of litigation suggest that the public
engagement and oversight required by NEPA are likely to be modest, particularly given that the
12

Federal agencies annually conduct hundreds of EISs, tens of thousands of abbreviated environmental assessments,
and hundreds of thousands of routine determinations that environmental impacts of a proposed action are
insignificant. See CEQ, NEPA Litigation, available at https://ceq.doe.gov/ceq-reports/litigation.html.
13
See infra Part I.A.
14
See Steven Stark & Sarah Wald, Setting No Records: The Failed Attempts to Limit the Record in Review of
Administrative Action, 36 ADMIN. L. REV. 333, 361 (1984) (claiming that courts in administrative law cases tend to
enforce procedural mandates more strongly than substantive requirements); James V. DeLong, New Wine for A New
Bottle: Judicial Review in the Regulatory State, 72 VA. L. REV. 399, 417 (1986) (“The courts are most comfortable
when assessing the procedural regularity of agency action.”).
15
The five federal agencies are the U.S. Forest Service (USFS), Bureau of Land Management (BLM), U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Service (FWS), National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE).
Among these agencies, the USFS and BLM accounted for approximately 50 percent of the district court cases.
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vast majority of environmental reviews under NEPA have a very limited scope. Important
exceptions can of course arise—the Keystone and Dakota Access pipelines come to mind—but it
would be a mistake to infer that these cases are in any way representative of NEPA processes
generally. In part due to the paucity of data, we worry that this is precisely what NEPA’s critics
are doing—generalizing from a few high-profile, unrepresentative cases. While litigation data
are also selective,16 they have at least two virtues—they highlight federal actions of significant
importance to stakeholders and recurring legal claims. Thus, while our litigation data are not
representative of “typical” NEPA processes, they provide insights into the contexts in which
NEPA procedures have heightened importance and the federal agencies likely to be most
impacted by them.
Our most far-reaching results expose the influence of judicial ideology and presidential
politics on judicial review. In district courts, plaintiffs were 2.8 times more likely to prevail
during the Bush Administration than during the Obama Administration, 2.5 times more likely to
prevail in the Ninth Circuit than other circuits, and almost twice as likely to prevail before a
district judge appointed by a Democratic president as one appointed by a Republican.17 At the
appellate level, plaintiffs were about 2.3 times more likely to prevail in the Ninth Circuit, but the
influence of presidential politics and judicial ideology were not statistically significant factors in
case outcomes. One reason for this result was that the absolute differences in case outcomes
associated with judicial ideology were much smaller during the Obama Administration. For
example, in appellate cases plaintiffs prevailed at much higher rates before Democratic-majority
than Republican-majority panels during the Bush Administration (38 versus 17 percent,
respectively), but this disparity essentially disappeared during the Obama Administration.
These results reveal that tensions between the environmental mandate of NEPA and
conservative presidential politics exacerbated the influence of ideological differences between
Democratic- and Republican-appointed judges. We identify a novel explanation for this
phenomenon: During a Republican administration, Republican judges will be sympathetic to the
Administration and unsympathetic to the liberal goals of NEPA (both factors aligning against
environmental plaintiffs), whereas Democratic judges will be sympathetic to the goals of NEPA
but unsympathetic to the Administration (both factors aligning in favor of environmental
plaintiffs). By contrast under a Democratic administration, Republican judges will be
unsympathetic to NEPA’s goals and to the Administration (both factors essentially neutral
towards environmental plaintiffs), whereas Democratic judges will be sympathetic to both (one
factor favoring and the other working against environmental plaintiffs). In short, the political
ideology of judges has the greatest influence on judicial review when the goals of the governing
statute under review are at odds with the politics of the presidential administration in power.
These results broaden the range of factors that influence the outcome of judicial review.
While excellent studies exist on the influence of judicial ideology, including the more complex
dynamics of three-judge appellate panels,18 to our knowledge no studies have evaluated it across
16

See, e.g., George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1
(1984).
17
These results are based on a logistic regressions discussed in detail below. See infra Part II.B.
18
See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717,
1721 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, et al., Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary
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presidential administrations with widely divergent policies. Similarly, until very recently, no
studies have systematically evaluated the variation in judicial review across circuits.19 This study
provides two principal insights: First, for issues like the environment that are ideologically
Democratic, we find that the influence of judicial ideology is greater during Republican than
Democratic administrations. However, we expect that this phenomenon is symmetric—for issues
that are politically conservative, the influence of judicial ideology will be higher during
Democratic administrations. Second, the alignment or misalignment of presidential politics with
statutory goals does not determine the political orientation of judicial review; the political
orientation turns instead on the balance of Democratic- and Republican-appointed judges in each
circuit and the distribution of cases across them.
NEPA litigation provides a model context for evaluating these dynamics due to the
concentration of cases in a handful of circuits. In particular, the fifty percent of cases filed in the
Ninth Circuit amplified the influence of its majority of Democratic-appointed appellate judges
both directly through the large volume of appellate cases and indirectly through their influence
on district court judges in the Ninth Circuit, who, irrespective of their political affiliation, ruled
in favor of plaintiffs at much higher rates than district judges in other circuits. These attributes
expose the ways in which the geography of circuits mediates the influence of judicial ideology
and the role of courts in checking agency action that is inconsistent with statutory goals. We find
that the dominant judicial ideology in larger circuits has greater influence nationally because,
with higher numbers of cases, rudimentary statistics cause them to account for a disproportionate
share of the politically uniform appellate panels.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I describes the legal framework for environmental
reviews under NEPA, discusses the limited information that is available on agency compliance
with NEPA, and examines the existing empirical literature on NEPA litigation. Part II describes
the details of the empirical studies we conducted, presents the descriptive statistics for the studies
of district court and appellate cases, and discusses the results of several logistic regressions and
other statistical analyses of the data. Part III concludes with a discussion of the implications for
NEPA procedures and policies and the role of judicial ideology in judicial review of agency
action. The normative and practical implications of our findings are explored by comparing
NEPA with the expanding array of legal mandates found in recent executive orders and pending
legislation in Congress that dramatically augment economic impact analyses. Ironically, the
same political forces seeking to curtail NEPA obligations based on their costs and associated
delays are simultaneously promoting the expansion of regulatory impact reviews. We show that
the inflexibility of the proposed reforms in conjunction with the politics of judicial review have a
much greater potential to increase agency costs and cause serious delays.

Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301, 305 (2004); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory
Policy?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 827 (2006); Matthew Spitzer & Eric Talley, Left, Right, and Center: Strategic
Information Acquisition and Diversity in Judicial Panels, 29 J. LAW ECON. & ORG. 638 (2013).
19
See Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in The Circuit Courts, 115 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017)
(evaluating the application of the Chevron doctrine in roughly 1600 cases issued from 2003 through 2013).
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I. The NEPA Framework in Practice
The emergence of the modern era of environmental law is commonly associated with
President Nixon’s nationally televised signing of NEPA into law on January 1, 1970.20 In part
because of its groundbreaking beginning, NEPA is often referred to as the Magna Carta of
Environmental Law;21 it set the stage for a period of unparalleled legislative reforms by
articulating a set of broad goals for environmental policy and establishing a procedural
framework for rigorous environmental reviews of any federal action with the potential to
significantly impact the environment.22
NEPA has had a profound impact on the consciousness of environmental issues within
the federal government, and its trademark framework for environmental reviews has been widely
adopted by countries around the world.23 NEPA is also the forerunner of other cross-cutting
forms of administrative procedure, such as the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA),24 Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act (UMRA),25 and Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA),26 that augment the
APA’s basic requirements by requiring agencies engaged in rulemaking to prepare economicoriented regulatory impact analyses. Similar to the APA, NEPA is government-wide in scope
and consequently subjects thousands of federal actions each year to environmental reviews.27
The strategic value of NEPA to stakeholders who oppose or have concerns about proposed
federal actions stems from this broad scope, the capacity of NEPA procedures to delay and draw
public attention to federal actions, and the potential for the information its environmental reviews
generate to provide grounds for halting or modifying projects that would otherwise pose
significant threats to human health or the environment.
In large part because of negative perceptions about aggressive litigation practices,
fundamental disagreements exist among policymakers and observers about the value of NEPA
procedures. These conflicting perspectives have been aptly summarized by Michael Blumm, who
is a prominent academic commentator:
NEPA seems to be a statute with two lives: part “paper tiger,” part “procedural
straightjacket”; apparently too vague to give courts authority to reverse agency actions for
conflicting with its policies, but still capable of inducing court injunctions when agencies
20

Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370h (2012)). For a
transcript of Nixon’s remarks, see Remarks on Signing the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (Jan. 1,
1970), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2446.
21
Shorna R. Broussard & Bianca D. Whitaker, The Magna Carta of Environmental Legislation: A Historical Look
at 30 Years of NEPA─Forest Service Litigation, 11 FOREST POL. & ECON. 134, 134 (2009); Michael Blumm &
Marla Nelson, Pluralism and the Environment Revisited: The Role of Comment Agencies in NEPA Litigation, 37
VERMONT L. REV. 5, 5 (2012).
22
NEPA’s environmental goals were defined broadly to include “promot[ing] efforts which will prevent or eliminate
damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man” and “attain[ing] the widest
range of beneficial uses of the environment without degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and
unintended consequences.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331.
23
See supra note 5.
24
5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612 (2012).
25
2 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1571 (2012).
26
44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3519 (2012).
27
See infra Part II.B.
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fail to satisfy its procedures. This process-laden approach to environmental policymaking
has both critics and defenders, but both seem to agree that what reviewing courts think
NEPA requires of agencies is not predictable.28
In essence, the debate over NEPA turns on disparate views about the burdens that its procedures
impose on federal agencies and the benefits of those procedures derived from better-informed
agency decision-making. Critics claim that NEPA reviews have ossified into rote processes with
little added value and that any potential benefits are more than offset by the time delays and costs
associated with conducting them.29 Supporters counter that most environmental reviews—which
they claim involve limited procedures and brief assessments—are conducted quickly (a few
weeks or less) and cheaply. 30 They maintain further that NEPA is essential to ensuring that all
federal agencies, particularly those inclined to pursue their missions without regard to the health
or environmental consequences, adequately consider and take into account the potential impacts
of their actions.31
Perhaps more than its authors anticipated, NEPA has figured prominently in many of the
most important environmental disputes and cases over the last forty years. The potential it held
for strategic delay was exploited within a year of NEPA’s passage when a group of
environmentalists filed a NEPA suit to enjoin construction of the infamous Tellico Dam, which
was poised to engulf the Little Tennessee Valley and to destroy one of the last free-flowing
rivers in the region.32 The NEPA suit ultimately delayed the project and gave the plaintiffs time
to initiate a second suit under the Endangered Species Act, TVA v. Hill,33 which remains one of
the seminal cases in environmental law.34 This early victory for environmentalists is just one
28

Blumm & Brown, supra note 21, at 279.
See, e.g., Eugene Burdach & Lucien Pugliaresi, The Environmental Impact Statement vs. The Real World, 49 PUB.
INTEREST 22 (1979) (case study of the Department of the Interior); William W. Hill & Leonard Ortolano, NEPA’s
Effect on the Consideration of Alternatives: A Crucial Test, 18 NAT. RESOURCES J. 285 (1978) (NEPA's requirement
to consider alternatives had only a cosmetic effect on the water resources project of the Soil Conservation Service
and the Corps of Engineers).
30
See, e.g., Arthur W. Murray, The National Environmental Policy Act and the Licensing Process: Environmentalist
Magna Carta or Agency Coup de Grace?, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 963 (1972); Sally K. Fairfax, A Disaster in the
Environmental Movement, 199 SCIENCE 743 (1999); Matthew J. Lindstrom, Procedures Without Purpose: The
Withering Away of the National Environmental Policy Act’s Substantive Law, 20 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
245 (2000); Paul J. Culhane, NEPA’s Impacts on Federal Agencies, Anticipated and Unanticipated, 20 ENVTL. L.
681 (1990); Lynton K. Caldwell, Beyond NEPA: Future Significance of the National Environmental Policy Act, 22
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 203 (1998); Michael C. Blumm, The National Environmental Policy Act at Twenty: A
Preface, 20 ENVTL. L. 447 (1990); Daniel R. Mandelker, The National Environmental Policy Act: A Review of Its
Implementation and Problems, 32 WASH. U.J.L. & POL’Y 293 (2010); John Ruple & Mark Capone, NEPA, FLPMA,
and Impact Reduction: An Empirical Assessment of BLM Resource Management Planning and NEPA in the
Mountain West, 46 ENVTL. L. 953 (2016) (study of impact of NEPA on BLM land use planning which concludes
that NEPA is capable of producing significant reductions in environmental impacts without incurring a
commensurate economic cost).
31
Proponents argue that NEPA compels agency managers to “[t]hink more carefully about the environment before
acting,” focusing their attention on environmental consequences that otherwise might not have come to their
attention. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward A Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing Government’s
Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 909 (2002).
32
MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING WATER 324-25 (1987).
33
437 U.S. 153 (1978).
34
REISNER, supra note 32, at 325-27.
29
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example among many that could be cited. NEPA lawsuits have been filed challenging a wide
range of federal activities, including management of public lands (grazing,35 oil and gas
development,36 mining,37 and forestry38), funding and permitting of major infrastructure
(highways,39 power lines,40 pipelines,41 and airports42), remediation and disposal of toxic or
nuclear waste,43 and operation of major military readiness testing and training exercises, ranges,
and other programs.44 NEPA procedures and litigation continue to provide important
opportunities for public engagement and agency oversight throughout the federal government.
A. Overview of NEPA Procedures
Congress described NEPA’s mandate as “protect[ing] public health, safety and
environmental quality by ensuring transparency, accountability and public involvement in
federal actions and in the use of public funds.”45 Senator Henry Jackson, NEPA’s principal
drafter, characterized its objectives in similarly expansive terms:
What is involved [in NEPA] is a declaration that we do not intend as a government or
as a people to initiate actions which endanger the continued existence or the health of
mankind: That we will not intentionally initiate actions which do irreparable damage
to the air, land and water which support life on earth.46
These ambitions are at odds with the statute’s relative simplicity and the nature of the mandates
it creates. As interpreted by the Supreme Court, NEPA is an entirely procedural statute. 47
Functionally, NEPA forces agencies to integrate consideration of environmental impacts into
their decision-making processes (the so-called “stop and think” function) and to disclose the
results of that analysis to others, including Congress and the public.48 At base, NEPA is premised
on generating information to enable agencies to identify alternatives to proposed actions that

35

E.g., NRDC v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829 (D.D.C. 1974), aff'd per curiam, 527 F.2d 1386 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
E.g., Sierra Club v. Peterson, 717 F.2d 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
37
E.g., N. Alaska Envtl. Ctr. v. Lujan, 961 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1992).
38
E.g., Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1985).
39
E.g., Catawaba Riverkeeper Found v. N. Carolina Dep’t of Transp., 843 F.3d 583 (4 th Cir. 2016).
40
E.g., Citizens & Landowners Against the Miles City/New Underwood Powerline v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Energy,
683 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1982).
41
E.g., Sierra Club v. U.S. Forest Serv., 828 F.3d 402 (6 th Cir. 2016).
42
E.g., Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
43
E.g., Coal. on West Valley Nuclear Wastes v. Chu, 592 F.3d 306 (2d Cir. 2009).
44
E.g., Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008).
45
American Recovery and Investment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1609(a)(1), 123 Stat. 115, 304. It added
that NEPA “helps to provide an orderly process for considering federal actions and funding decisions and prevents
ligation and delay that would otherwise be inevitable and existed prior to the establishment of the National
Environmental Policy Act.” Id. § 1609(a)(3).
46
115 Cong. Rec. 40416 (1969).
47
Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1980).
48
See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989) (asserting that NEPA “ensures that
the agency, in reaching its decision, will have available, and will carefully consider, detailed information concerning
significant environmental impacts; it also guarantees that the relevant information will be made available to the
larger audience that may also play a role in . . . the decisionmaking process”).
36
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would accomplish agency objectives with fewer adverse environmental effects.49 A federal
agency proposing a “major federal action” must evaluate whether it will have significant effects
on human health or the environment (broadly construed) and, if so, prepare an EIS analyzing the
impacts and considering the relative merits of alternative actions.50 In many cases, this initial
review entails undertaking an abbreviated analysis, referred to as an “environmental assessment”
(EA), to ascertain whether the environmental impacts of a proposed action have the potential to
be significant.51 For more routine federal actions, which neither individually nor collectively
have the potential to be environmentally significant, agencies can designate them under
“categorical exclusions” (CEs) to be exempt from NEPA procedures. As described below, the
vast majority of NEPA compliance is covered by CEs and EAs; preparation of EISs is the
exception rather than the rule.
To enable independent oversight of NEPA compliance, Congress established a new
federal office, the Council on Environmental Quality, that is based in the White House.52 The
CEQ has issued regulations specifying how agencies must comply with NEPA, such as defining
the range of environmental effects that must be considered.53 NEPA procedures have been
augmented over time through subsequent legislative amendments and regulatory amendments.54
The Clean Air Act, for example, now requires the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to
review and comment on all EISs.55 The added procedures, EPA reviews, and continuing CEQ
oversight provide valuable checks on the quality of the environmental reviews agencies conduct
and the degree of their compliance with NEPA procedures, but the level of scrutiny and support
for NEPA vary substantially according to the priorities of each presidential administration.
The primary responsibility for implementing NEPA ultimately rests with the federal
agencies that are subject to its procedures. Similar to compliance with the APA,56 we expected
for this reason that compliance with NEPA would vary substantially across federal agencies
despite the oversight from CEQ and EPA. Absent the threat of litigation, federal agencies
proposing major actions practically have final say over their compliance with NEPA.
Recognizing the limits of CEQ and EPA oversight, critics of agency compliance with NEPA
have charged that “the gap between the purpose and practice of NEPA and the failure of
environmental agencies to regulate fairly so as to protect public health and the environment has

49

The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), which NEPA created, describes the analysis of alternatives (and
their comparative environmental effects) as “the heart of” an EIS. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (2016).
50
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2012).
51
If an agency finds that they are insignificant, it issues a “finding of no significant impact” (FONSI) and its NEPA
responsibilities end. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.13.
52
42 U.S.C. § 4344 (2012) (setting forth the CEQ’s duties and functions).
53
40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(b).
54
Congress has also exempted certain agency actions from NEPA or watered down the statute’s procedural
requirements. See, e.g., Healthy Forests Restoration Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-148, 117 Stat. 1887 (codified at
16 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6591 (2012)).
55
42 U.S.C. § 7609(a) (2012).
56
See Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Agency-Specific Precedents, 89 TEX. L. REV. 499 (2011); Kristin E.
Hickman, Agency-Specific Precedents: Rational Ignorance or Deliberate Strategy?, 89 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 89
(2011); Christopher J. Walker, Chevron Deference and Patent Exceptionalism, 65 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 149 (2016).
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created a dissonance between the law stated and its operation in the real world.”57 In this light,
litigation is essential to ensuring that federal agencies, especially those with developmentoriented missions, comply fully with NEPA’s procedural mandates.
B. The Limited Understanding of NEPA Compliance
Empirical studies of NEPA have provided important insights into the frequency of
environmental reviews, variation in compliance patterns within and across federal agencies, and
the nature of litigation under the statute. However, much of this work has focused on relatively
short periods of time or specific agencies and only one study has examined the influence of
ideology in judicial review.58 Given the critiques of NEPA procedures as productive of
unwarranted delays, we will focus initially on the studies of NEPA compliance, which provide a
broader context for evaluating the impact of litigation, and studies that focus on the distribution
and frequency of litigation under NEPA.
A central challenge for empirical studies of NEPA compliance is the paucity of data
available. Federal agencies typically do not record the number of CEs or EAs they issue, despite
the fact that most agency compliance with NEPA is covered by them.59 The estimates that do
exist find that roughly 94 percent of NEPA decisions fall under CEs,60 about 5 percent are
covered by EAs, and less than 1 percent are reviewed under EISs.61 If one includes draft,
supplemental, and final NEPA documents government-wide, this estimate translates into the
preparation of an average of roughly 137,750 CEs, 6,820 EAs, and about 435 EISs annually for

57

James S. Freeman & Rachel D. Godsil, The Question of Risk: Incorporating Community Perceptions into
Environmental Risk Assessments, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 547, 558 (1994).
58
JAY E. AUSTIN ET AL., JUDGING NEPA: A “HARD LOOK” AT JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING UNDER THE NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT 1, 1-2 (2004).
59
U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO-14-370, National Environmental Policy Act: Little Information
Exists on NEPA Analyses 8 (April 2014).
60
The GAO noted, however, that “[the Department of Energy (DOE)] and the Forest Service officials told us that
CEs are likely underrepresented in their totals because agency systems do not track certain categories of CEs
considered ‘routine’ activities, such as emergency preparedness planning.” Id. at 8-9. Under some agency
regulations, the application of a CE need not be memorialized in a record of decision.
61
Id. at 8. These are crude estimates and there is clearly variation by agency. The numbers are drawn from
experience with specific agencies. For example, “[DOE] reported that 95 percent of its 9,060 NEPA analyses from
fiscal year 2008 to fiscal year 2012 were CEs, 2.6 percent were EAs, and 2.4 percent were EISs or supplement
analyses.” Id. Similarly, the FHWA also reported that approximately 96 percent of highway projects were processed
as CEs in 2009. Id; cf. Congressional Research Service, The Role of the Environmental Review Process in Federally
Funded Highway Projects: Background and Issues for Congress 5 (April 11, 2012),
http://environment.transportation.org/pdf/proj_delivery_stream/crs_report_envrev.pdf (reporting that 96% of
FHWA-approved projects “involve no significant environmental impacts and, hence, require limited documentation,
analysis, or review under NEPA).
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the period 2008 through 2015.62 However, significant inter-agency variability exists.63 For the
period 2008 through 2015, EPA data reveal that the actual number of EISs issued each year is
consistent with this estimate, averaging 224 draft and 211 EISs per year, but the number of final
EISs declined over this period from a high of 277 in 2008 to about 190 by 2014 and 2015.64
Currently, the number of final EISs issued annually appears to have settled in the range of 185 to
200.65
Studies of NEPA processes find that a relatively small number of federal agencies
account for most of the environmental reviews. According to EPA and CEQ data for the period
1998 through 2015, four federal agencies issued more than 50 percent of the EISs published
nationally: on average for this period the USFS accounted for 24 percent, the BLM accounted for
8 percent, the USACE accounted for 10 percent, and the FHWA accounted for 13 percent.66 The
EPA data also reveal that 36 other federal agencies issued at least one EIS per year over the
period 2012 through 2015, with the National Park Service (NPS) and the FWS accounting for
another 10 percent of the EISs issued, and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
rising in prominence starting in 2015 when it began issuing roughly the same number of EISs
each year as the FWS.67
Cost and timing data for NEPA analyses are also difficult to obtain.68 In 2003, a NEPA
task force report “estimated that an EIS typically costs from $250,000 to $2 million, whereas an
EA typically costs from $5,000 to $200,000.”69 The National Association of Environmental
Professionals (NAEP) collects data on the time it takes for EISs to be completed. In a report
covering the time period 2000 through 2012, it found that the average preparation time was 4.6
years in 2012 and that EIS preparation times had increased on average at a rate of 34 days per

62

GAO, supra note 59, at 9 (the calculation is based on an extrapolation from the percentages for each NEPA
process using the number of EISs issued by federal agencies in 2011). For further comparison, CEQ was required to
collect and issue a report on NEPA compliance in 2009. See Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1609(c), 123 Stat. 115, 304
(2009); American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 & NEPA, https://ceq.doe.gov/ceqreports/recovery_act_reports.html. For most federal agencies, CEs represented 86 percent of their NEPA
compliance, while EAs and EISs were prepared for 17 and 3 percent, respectively, of the government actions. Id.
63
For example, the USFS has reported that 78 percent of the 14,574 NEPA analyses it conducted from 2008 through
2012 were CEs, 20 percent were EAs, and 2 percent were EISs. GAO, supra note 59, at 9.
64
EPA data were downloaded from the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) Database for the period January 1,
2012, through December 31, 2015, which is available at: https://cdxnodengn.epa.gov/cdx-enepapublic/action/eis/search. These results are roughly consistent with other work finding that EPA reported 253
(standard deviation of 26) EISs annually during the period 1987 through 2006. Piet deWitt & Carole A. deWitt, How
Long Does It Take to Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement, 10 ENVTL. PRACTICE 164, 171 (Dec. 2008).
65
The number of EISs issued annually was derived from the EPA EIS database. Id.
66
GAO, supra note 59, at 11; EPA data cited in note 62.
67
The U.S. Navy, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Federal Transit Administration, Bureau of Reclamation,
National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration, and Department of Energy each accounted for between 2 and 3
percent of the EISs issued from 2012 through 2015 according to the EPA data. EPA data cited in note 62.
68
GAO, supra note 59, at 12.
69
Id. at 13-14. DOE collects some of the most detailed information on costs. For the period 2003 through 2012, it
found that the median cost of an EIS was $1.4 million and the average $6.6 million, with costs ranging from a low of
$60,000 to a high of $85 million; it also estimated that the median cost of an EA is $65,000, with a range from
$3,000 to $1.2 million. Id.
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year.70 In another survey covering 20 years (1987-2006), the average time for agencies to prepare
an EIS was 3.4 years, with a standard deviation of 2.7 years and a strikingly broad range of 51
days to 18.4 years.71 This study also found significant differences among federal agencies, with
the FHWA and USACE having mean preparation times that were 1.9 and 1.26 times longer,
respectively, than the average for other federal agencies.72 Large differences therefore exist in
preparation times for EISs both within and among federal agencies.73
Studies on the benefits of NEPA processes are even more limited and to the extent they
exist are largely impressionistic. According to a 2015 GAO report, the principal benefits are
enhanced transparency of agency decision-making, increased public participation, early
discovery and mitigation of environmental impacts associated with a proposed federal action,74
improvement of projects based on better or more complete environmental information, and at
least in some cases time savings from project improvements identified through the NEPA
process.75 The study found it exceedingly difficult to monetize the benefits of NEPA processes
due to the non-market nature of the resources and environmental amenities impacted.76 The GAO
also found it was difficult to allocate the costs of compliance because NEPA procedures overlap
with those required under other federal laws, presidential executive orders, and state and local
laws.77 The mix of practical, methodological, and resource constraints highlight the obstacles to
obtaining direct measures of both the costs and benefits of NEPA procedures.
C. The Existing Studies of NEPA Litigation
A relatively small number of government and independent studies exist on NEPA
litigation.78 Empirical studies of litigation and surveys of agency officials confirm that “most
NEPA analyses do not result in litigation.”79 According to the CEQ, the number of NEPA cases
filed in federal district courts was highest in the 1970s, roughly between 150 and 190 cases
annually, and subsequently dropped to about 100 cases per year in the decades that followed.80
70

NAEP, Annual NEPA Report 2012 of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Practice (Apr. 2013),
https://ceq.doe.gov/docs/get-involved/NAEP_2013_NEPA_Annual_Report.pdf. Less information is available on
EAs. According to a 2013 DOE report, the average completion time for an EA issued by DOE was 13 months; by
contrast, the average for the USFS was about 19 months in 2012. GAO, supra note 59, at 16. Even less information
is collected on CEs, but rough estimates exist that range from typical times of 1-2 days within DOE to 177 days
within the USFS. Id. at 16.
71
deWitt, supra note 64, at 167.
72
The average for other federal agencies (excluding the USFS, which was slightly lower) was 2.9 years (standard
deviation of 2 years), whereas the average for the FHWA was 5.5 years (standard deviation of 3.2 years) and the
average for USACE was 3.7 years (standard deviation of 2.4 years). Id.
73
The FHWA is an extreme outlier among federal agencies (completing less than 10 percent of its EISs in two years
or less), while the USFS managed to prepare more than half of its EISs in two years or less. Id. at 169.
74
As Professor Karkkainen has explained, NEPA “create[s] powerful incentives for agencies to structure and
characterize their activities so as to avoid the full NEPA-mandated EIS inquiry,” such as by building mitigation
features into a project to lower the impacts below the significance threshold that triggers the duty to prepare an EIS.
Karkkainen, supra note 31, at 920; see also id. at 935-36.
75
GAO, supra note 59, at 16-17.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id. at 19-20.
79
Id. at 19.
80
Id. at 20.
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Data on circuit cases are more limited, with data from 2012 indicating that 25-30 cases are filed
each year.81 The CEQ data suggest that about half of the district court cases involved challenges
to EISs and that from 2008 through 2011 federal defendants prevailed in more than 50 percent of
them.82 The few studies of circuit court cases indicate that federal defendants prevail at a higher
rate, with a recent report from NAEP finding that federal agencies prevailed in 86 percent of the
appellate cases involving NEPA claims in 2012.83
A handful of independent empirical studies exist that complement the CEQ and NAEP
reports.84 However, each is limited in one or more of the following respects: (1) the data are
limited to a narrow time period; (2) the data are highly aggregated; (3) the decisions analyzed are
associated with a single federal agency or court; or (4) the analysis is limited to descriptive
statistics. Since 2001, the CEQ has collected some of the most valuable data on NEPA litigation.
Its annual surveys provide statistics on the number of NEPA cases by federal agency, national
statistics on the legal bases for each decision, and statistics on the classes of plaintiffs (i.e., public
interest group, individual, business group, state or local government).85 The CEQ data display
interesting patterns, particularly variation in litigation success rates over time, but we found the
coding of the cases to be subject to a number of inconsistencies and inaccuracies.
Several studies have focused on NEPA litigation against the USFS.86 These studies
provide valuable insights into litigation patterns over a period of 20-30 years, including changes
in the geographic distribution of cases, the types of federal actions challenged, the frequency of
suits by different classes of plaintiffs, the types of claims asserted by plaintiffs, and the success
rates of specific claims. Other work has focused on the 17 cases decided by the Supreme Court87
and the influence on judicial review of comments from federal agencies other than the lead
agency conducting a NEPA analysis.88 All of this work has enhanced understanding of NEPA
litigation and implementation, but the information it provides remains substantially incomplete.89
81

Id.
Id. at 21. For example, in 2011 CEQ found that federal defendant prevailed in 68 percent of the cases. Id.
83
Id. at 22.
84
Earlier studies include the following: Paul G. Kent & John A. Pendergrass, Has NEPA Become a Dead Issue—
Preliminary Results of a Comprehensive Study of NEPA Litigation,” 5 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 11 (1986) (citing
statistics showing that most NEPA litigation involves challenges to agency decisions not to prepare an EIS);
Lucinda Low Swartz, Recent NEPA Cases (2004), https://ceq.doe.gov/docs/lawsregulations/NEPA_Cases_2004_NAEP_paper.pdf (noting that agencies won 60% of cases in 2004 in which there
was a substantive decision on NEPA issues).
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See https://ceq.doe.gov/ceq-reports/litigation.html.
86
See Broussard & Whitaker, supra note 21; Amanda Miner et al., Twenty Years of Forest Service National
Environmental Policy Act Litigation, 12 ENVTL. PRACTICE 116 (2010).
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Richard J. Lazarus, The Power of Persuasion before and within the Supreme Court: Reflections on NEPA’s Zero
for Seventeen Record at the High Court, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 231 (2012).
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Blumm & Nelson, supra note 21, at 7 (concluding that “[t]wo decades ago, agency comments explained a high
percentage of the outcomes of NEPA litigation; twenty-some years later, the correlation between agency comments
and case outcomes is somewhat less obvious”).
89
In particular, relatively little information exists about the case outcomes. See, e.g., Jim Vines, Stephanie Salek, &
Kelsey Desloover, Reforming NEPA Review of Energy Projects, King & Spaulding Energy Newsletter (Dec. 2012),
http://www.kslaw.com/library/newsletters/EnergyNewsletter/2012/December/article1.html (finding that an average
of 24 temporary restraining orders and preliminary and permanent injunctions halting projects were issued each year
between 2001 and 2009); Congressional Research Service, The National Environmental Policy Act: Streamlining
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The empirical studies of litigation involving the USFS are the most sophisticated and
detailed. Several broad patterns emerge from this work. Consistent with other studies, the USFS
led other federal agencies in the number of EISs prepared each year, averaging 147 draft and
final EISs annually from 1998 through 2008.90 For federal cases filed against the USFS, the
available studies indicated that the most common claims involved challenges to either an EA or
EIS.91 Given that EAs are issued much more frequently than EISs, these statistics imply that
EISs are challenged at far higher rates than EAs. Geographically, more than half of the cases
were filed in the Ninth Circuit,92 which reflects at least in part the fact that over 60 percent of
USFS lands are located in the states encompassed by it.93 In addition, the results were mixed
with respect to whether plaintiffs prevailed at different rates based on the circuit in which a
NEPA suit was filed, with conflicting findings about whether the Ninth Circuit favors plaintiffs
more than other circuits.94
The studies also find interesting patterns in the outcomes of NEPA litigation. In both
district and circuit courts, environmental organizations were the most common plaintiffs,
typically representing 60 to 70 percent of the NEPA cases filed, whereas business interests and
user groups filed only about 8 percent of the cases.95 Moreover, while the USFS won roughly 60NEPA 10 (2006), http://nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/crs/RL33267.pdf (noting that in 2004,
170 NEPA-related case were filed, but only 11 resulted in an injunction).
90
Miner et al., supra note 85, at 116.
91
Broussard & Whitaker, supra note 21, at 138 (finding that challenges to EAs or EISs accounted for 36 percent of
the district court cases and 48 percent of the appellate cases; 55 percent of the district court cases and 35 percent of
the appellate cases involved claims that an EA or EIS should have been prepared); Miner et al, supra note 85, at
124.
92
Broussard & Whitaker, supra note 21, at 137 (finding that 61% of the cases were filed in the Ninth Circuit, 12%
in the Tenth Circuit, and 7% in the Eighth Circuit); Miner et al., supra note 85, at 120 (finding that 64% of cases
were filed in the Ninth Circuit).
93
Denise M. Keele & Robert W. Malmsheimer, Is the Ninth Circuit a Liberal Environmental Activist Court?, 37
JUSTICE SYS. J. 115, 118 (2016) (observing that the “Ninth Circuit has jurisdiction over more public lands than any
other federal circuit”); Robert W. Malmsheimer et al., National Forest Litigation in the US Courts of Appeals, 112 J.
FORESTRY 20, 21 (2004) (observing that 63% of USFS land is located in the Ninth Circuit); Kirsten Ronholt, Where
the Wild Things Were: A Chance to Keep Alaska's Challenge of the Roadless Rule Out of the Supreme Court, 29
ALASKA L. REV. 237, 259 (2012) (reporting that, as of 2001, almost sixty percent of national forest acreage
(122,092,000 acres) was located in the Ninth Circuit).
94
Keele & Malmsheimer, supra note 92, at 118 (concluding that “the Ninth Circuit was not significantly more
activist than other circuits over the time period [1989-2008]”); id. at 131 (concluding that district courts located
within the Ninth Circuit were statistically significantly more likely to reverse agency action (36.2 percent) than the
decisions of district courts located within all other circuits (21 percent)); Susan Hair, Judicial Selection and Decision
Making in the Ninth Circuit, 48 ARIZONA L. REV. 267, 283-85 (2006) (concluding that while there is evidence that
individual judges make decision on ideological grounds, the Ninth Circuit as a whole is not more liberal than other
circuits); Lettie M. Wenner & Lee E. Dutter, Contextual Influence on Court Outcomes, 41 WESTERN POL. Q. 115,
115-16 (1988) (finding that that the First, Second, Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits were more responsive to
environmental demands, while the Fourth, Tenth, and Eleventh were more responsive to industry demands);
Malmsheimer et al, supra note 95 at 23 (finding that the USFS had the highest likelihood of prevailing in the Tenth
(67%) and Eighth (71%) Circuits and the lowest in the Ninth Circuit (49%)); Amanda Miner et al., Twenty Years of
Forest Service Land Management Litigations, 112 J. FORESTRY 32, 35 (2014) (concluding that the USFS was most
successful in the Seventh Circuit (80%) and the least in the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits (48%)).
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Broussard & Whitaker, supra note 21, at 137 (in a study of 291 district and circuit court cases litigated between
1970 and 2001, environmental organizations were the plaintiffs in 61 and 66 percent of the district and circuit court
cases, respectively); Beth Gambino Portuese et al., Litigants’ Characteristics and Outcomes in U.S. Forest Service
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70 percent of the NEPA cases,96 environmental organizations prevailed at higher rates than other
plaintiffs.97 Two studies also found mixed evidence that rates at which plaintiffs prevailed varied
by administration, with an earlier study finding higher success rates during the Reagan
Administration relative to both the George H.W. Bush and Clinton Administrations, and a later
study failing to find statistically significant differences between the George W. Bush and Obama
administrations.98
One study of NEPA litigation has examined the influence of judicial ideology on case
outcomes, but it was limited to the first term of the Bush Administration and the analysis
consisted solely of descriptive statistics.99 It nevertheless found dramatic differences between
Democratic- and Republican-appointed judges in NEPA cases at the district court and appellate
levels.100 Beyond this work, a large literature exists on the role of judicial ideology in federal
cases, including a small number of studies that examine environmental cases.101 A groundbreaking study from the late 1990s examined the impact of judicial ideology on environmental
cases decided by the D.C. Circuit.102 Consistent with the results in the recent NEPA study, the
authors found that “ideology significantly influences judicial decisionmaking” and “that a
judge’s vote (not just the panel outcome) is greatly affected by the identity [i.e., political
affiliation] of the other judges sitting on the panel.”103 The central finding of the study was that
“judges generally vote consistently with their ideological preferences only when they sit with at
Land-Management Cases 1989-2005, 107 J. FORESTRY 16, 18-19 (Jan./Feb. 2009) (finding that of 2,501 parties
involved in 949 cases from 1989 to 2005, the top twelve parties were all environmental organizations).
96
Broussard & Whitaker, supra note 21, at 137 (finding that the USFS won 60 percent of the district and 57% of the
circuit court cases); Gambino Portuese, supra note 95, at 19 (finding that the USFS won 70 percent of the cases
litigated); Miner et al., supra note 85, at 123 (finding that the USFS won 66% of the NEPA cases litigated); Miner et
al., supra note 93, at 34 (finding that the USFS won 70% of the appeals and 64% cases decided on the merits).
97
Broussard & Whitaker, supra note 21, at 135; Gambino Portuese, supra note 95, at 17 (finding that repeat
litigants, which were overwhelming environmental organizations, were more likely to prevail in their claims);
Miner, supra note 95, at 35 (finding that the USFS won only 49 percent of the cases filed by environmental interests
versus 70 percent of cases involving other plaintiffs).
98
Malmsheimer et al., supra note 95, at 22 (finding that the USFS won a lower proportion of cases during the
Reagan Administration (28.6%) than George H.W. Bush Administration (64%) and Clinton Administration (80%));
Keele & Malmsheimer, supra note 92, at 126 (finding that the differences in rates at which the USFS prevailed was
not statistically significant between the George W. Bush and Obama Administrations).
99
AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 58, at 1-2 (reporting findings for 325 district court and appellate cases decided during
the first term of the George W. Bush Administration that substantial differences existed in case outcomes based on
the party affiliation of the judge(s) hearing the case).
100
The authors found that Democratic-appointed district judges were twice as likely to rule in favor of
environmental plaintiffs as Republican-appointed judges (58 versus 28 percent, respectively) and that on appeal
Democratic-majority panels were six times more likely to rule in favor of environmental plaintiffs as Republicanmajority panels (58 versus 10 percent, respectively). Id. at 8-9. Because the number of appellate cases was modest
(107 in total) and they were subdivided according to the balance of Democratic- and Republican-appointed judges,
interpretation of the data would have benefitted from a formal statistical analysis of the results.
101
Revesz, supra note 18, at 1721 (examining 250 environmental cases decided by the D.C. Circuit between 1970
and 1994); Sunstein et al., supra note 18, at 305; Miles & Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy, supra note
18, at 827; Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 761,
761 (2008); Robert Steinbuch, An Empirical Analysis of Reversal Rates in the Eighth Circuit During 2008, 43
LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 51, 51 (2009).
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Revesz, supra note 101, at 1717-18.
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least one other judge of the same political party.”104 Given the importance of the effects observed
in these studies, as well as a large body of work in other areas of law,105 we collected background
information on federal judges, including the party of the president that nominated each judge.
The existing literature reveals that while thousands of federal actions are potentially
subject to NEPA procedures, the vast majority are either exempted under CEs or reviewed under
streamlined EAs. The few available studies also suggest that legal challenges to such abridged
NEPA procedures are exceedingly rare, particularly relative to the large number of NEPA
reviews that are conducted annually, but the data are limited in scope and time. The most
consistent observation is that EISs and NEPA litigation are concentrated in western states and a
small number of federal agencies. As discussed further below, this geographic bias influences
inter-circuit differences in judicial review of NEPA compliance, whereas the dominance of a few
federal agencies drastically limits the impact of NEPA procedures on most federal agencies.
Questions left unresolved by the existing studies include whether case outcomes differ
significantly across circuits, administrations, and classes of plaintiffs, as well as the degree to
which judicial ideology is a consistent factor in determining outcome of judicial review.
II. The Patterns of NEPA Litigation and Factors that Influence Case Outcomes
Our studies of district and circuit court cases used both traditional sampling methods and
automated coding for the entire population of cases in our database: 1,572 district court and 656
circuit court opinions issued from 2001 through 2015. In addition, we collected data on an initial
round of 200 cases from a comprehensive list of NEPA cases litigated during the Bush
Administration and a second sample of about 175 cases filed during the Obama Administration.
These subsamples included cases that were settled or dismissed prior to a legal ruling on the
merits and were essential to estimating settlement rates, which differed substantially between the
two administrations. Most of our analysis, however, centers on the full population study of
NEPA cases and two samples consisting of 498 district and 334 circuit court cases. The details of
the empirical methods and protocols are described in the Appendix.
The analysis we conducted includes a mix of descriptive statistics (i.e., a breakdown of
cases by agency, circuit, class of plaintiff, claims raised) and formal statistical methods for
hypothesis testing. The descriptive statistics provide insights into the broad patterns of NEPA
litigation and highlight the variation in litigation across agencies, circuits, and administrations.
Consistent with prior studies, we find that the impact of NEPA as measured by litigation rates is
skewed towards a small subset of agencies, but the specific claims raised and the rates at which
plaintiffs prevail were relatively uniform. The variation we observe in case outcomes is
associated with the presidential administration, the circuit in which a case is filed, and the
political affiliation of the judge(s) hearing the case.
Beyond gaining a broader understanding of the distribution of NEPA litigation and the
parties filing the cases, we embarked on the project with ten central hypotheses that were
104
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motivated by the prior empirical work and our knowledge of NEPA processes and litigation. The
hypotheses fall into three basic categories: (1) those related to the influence of judicial ideology
on case outcomes (hypotheses 1-5); (2) those related to external explanatory variables, such as
agency and circuit (hypotheses 6-9); and (3) those related to the nature of the NEPA claims
asserted (hypothesis 10). The specific hypotheses were as follows:
Hypothesis 1: District court judges appointed by Democratic presidents will be more
likely to rule in favor of environmental, or other similarly situated, plaintiffs than district
court judges appointed by Republican presidents because of the widespread political
polarization of environmental issues.
Hypothesis 2: Appellate panels on which circuit judges appointed by Democratic
presidents are in the majority will be more likely to rule in favor of environmental, or
other similarly situated, plaintiffs than appellate panels on which circuit judges
appointed by Republican presidents are in the majority because of the widespread
political polarization of environmental issues. As a corollary, appellate panels with all
Republican or Democratic judges will have the greatest differences in the rates at which
environmental plaintiffs succeed.
Hypothesis 3: Judges will be more deferential to administrations in which the president is
from the same party as the president that appointed them—Republican-appointed judges
will be more deferential to Republican administrations and Democrat-appointed judges
will be more deferential to Democratic administrations.
Hypothesis 4: The influence of judicial ideology in NEPA cases will be greater during
Republican than Democratic administrations because the ideological commitments of
judges will align in different ways. During a Republican administration, Democratic
judges will be ideologically opposed to the administration and sympathetic to NEPA’s
environmental mandate, whereas Republican judges will be ideologically sympathetic to
the administration and opposed to NEPA; as a consequence, the potential influence of
ideology will be magnified. By contrast, during a Democratic administration, Democratappointed judges’ ideological commitments will be split between the administration and
NEPA’s environmental mandate, whereas Republic-appointed judges will not be
sympathetic to either; as a consequence, the potential influence of ideology will be
moderated.
Hypothesis 5: District court judges will be more willing to rule against federal agencies
in NEPA actions than in administrative challenges generally because the risk of being
overturned is very low given that federal agencies so rarely appeal judgments against
them.
Hypothesis 6: Plaintiffs will succeed at higher rates during the Bush Administration than
the Obama Administration in district and appellate court cases because compliance with
NEPA will, on average, be less rigorous during the Bush Administration.
Hypothesis 7: Circuits in which a large number of NEPA cases are filed will be less
deferential to federal agencies because, analogous to a specialized court, familiarity with
18

the legal issues and more extensive circuit precedent will lead to less deferential judicial
review.
Hypothesis 8: The rate at which plaintiffs prevail against agencies subject to high rates
of NEPA litigation will be lower than that for agencies rarely subject to litigation
because the risk of noncompliance with be greater for these agencies, inducing them to
heed NEPA’s requirements more conscientiously than if litigation risks were low.
Hypothesis 9: Environmental plaintiffs are more likely to prevail in NEPA lawsuits than
other classes of plaintiffs because their interests are closely aligned with the statutory
mandate and they file the great majority of cases.
Hypothesis 10: Consistent with standards for judicial review of administrative
proceedings, claims that involve technical determinations implicating agency expertise
will be less likely to succeed than claims involving purely legal or procedural challenges.
The testing of these hypotheses through a series of logistic regressions was
complemented by an examination of descriptive statistics that provided an initial gauge of the
variation in NEPA litigation across the key explanatory variables. Overall, we find solid to
strong support for hypotheses 1-6 & 9, qualified support for hypothesis 7, and no support for
hypotheses 8 and 10. These results reveal that while the rates of NEPA litigation vary
dramatically across agencies, case outcomes are surprisingly uniform despite the heterogeneity
of agency actions and mandates. The patterns found to be consistent with statistical testing are
closely associated with the political affiliation of judges, specific circuits, the politics of
presidential administrations, and the type of plaintiff, but we observe substantial differences
between the district and circuit court cases that reflect their respective positions in the judicial
hierarchy and modes of operation. These results suggest that the influence of judicial ideology on
case outcomes cannot be evaluated in isolation, as it is mediated by presidential politics and
structural factors, such as the distribution of cases across circuits and the statistics governing the
ideological balance of three-judge appellate panels.
A. The Concentration of NEPA Litigation Regionally and Substantively
We find little evidence that environmental plaintiffs,106 whether national or local
organizations, are using NEPA for purely strategic reasons to hold up government action. If
environmental plaintiffs were filing cases purely on strategic grounds, instead of the merits, we
would expect them to prevail less often than other plaintiffs. Yet, they won substantially more
often at the district court level than other plaintiffs (35 versus 16 percent, respectively) and on
appeal (27 versus 14 percent). Environmental organizations also accounted for roughly twothirds of the district and circuit court cases, with local environmental groups filing about twice as
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Plaintiffs were divided into five broad classes: local environmental organizations; national environmental
organizations; other non-governmental organizations; businesses and business associations; and cities, counties,
states, and tribes. “National environmental organizations” were defined narrowly to include a small number of highprofile environmental organizations (e.g., Sierra Club, Natural Resources Defense Council, National Wildlife
Federation, Center for Biological Diversity) to identify the organizations that litigated a large share of NEPA cases.

19

many cases as national environmental groups in our sample.107 By contrast, businesses or
business associations were plaintiffs in just 7 percent of the district and appellate court cases.108
In the broader context of judicial review, the success rates of environmental organizations were
similar to the averages for challenges to agency action in a wide range of empirical studies;109
moreover, they were substantially higher than the global averages during the Bush
Administration.110 These findings, along with the roughly proportional share of appeals by
environmental organizations (i.e., rates comparable to other plaintiffs), provide strong evidence
that NEPA litigation is grounded on legitimate claims.111 In sum, neither the number of cases
filed annually nor their outcomes suggests that NEPA litigation is out of step with litigation in
other areas of administrative law.
Contrary to our eighth hypothesis, we observe no meaningful differences in case
outcomes or characteristics across federal agencies despite the enormous range of federal actions
that NEPA encompasses.112 The only exception is the number of cases filed—consistent with
earlier studies, a small number of agencies are the subject of most NEPA litigation. However,
this pattern is partly attributable to the diverse mandates of federal agencies, many of which do
not involve actions that have significant environmental impacts. To give just one example, the
FHWA is much more likely through its highway funding programs to trigger a full NEPA review
107

At the district court level, local environmental groups filed 46 percent of the cases in our sample and national
environmental groups filed 24 percent; at the circuit court level, they filed 40 and 24 percent of the cases,
respectively. The plaintiffs in a significant number of cases included both local and national environmental
organizations; these cases were categorized as having been filed by national environmental organizations.
108
In addition, cities, counties, states, or tribes were plaintiffs in 7 percent of the district court cases and 11 percent
of the appeals; individuals and non-governmental organizations filed 5 and 11 percent, respectively, of the district
court cases and accounted for 7 and 11 percent, respectively, of the appeals.
109
See Richard J. Pierce & Joshua Weiss, An Empirical Study of Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of
Agency Rules, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 515, 515 (2011) (observing that “[c]ourts at all levels of the federal judiciary
uphold agency actions in about 70% of cases” irrespective of the standard of review that they apply); Richard J.
Pierce, What Do the Studies of Judicial Review of Agency Actions Mean?, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 77, 84-85 (2011)
(synthesizing the results of numerous empirical studies of judicial review and finding that agencies prevail in 64-81
percent of the cases at the circuit level); Sunstein, supra note 101, at 767-68 (reporting data on administrative review
cases involving EPA indicating that agencies prevailed on average 72 percent of administrative challenges on
appeal). A recent study finds that success rates in adjudicated cases in federal courts fell from 70 percent in 1985 to
33 percent in 2009. Alexandra D. Lahav & Peter Siegelman, The Curious Incident of the Falling Win Rate,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2993423. Thus, plaintiff success rates in NEPA cases are
similar to the recent figures on success rates in civil cases generally in the federal courts.
110
The disparity in success rates between environmental and other plaintiffs was far greater during the Bush than the
Obama Administration. Specifically, during the Bush Administration environmental organizations prevailed in 45
percent and other plaintiffs in just 20 percent of the cases; during the Obama Administration, they prevailed in 24
and 13 percent, respectively, of the cases. On appeal during the Bush Administration, environmental organizations
prevailed in 35 percent of the cases and other plaintiffs prevailed in 16 percent, whereas during the Obama
Administration, the success rates converged to 17 and 15 percent, respectively.
111
Litigants motivated by a desire to delay projects may, of course, also have strong substantive grounds under
NEPA for challenging such projects.
112
During the Bush Administration, none of the differences was statistically significant or sizeable in absolute
terms—regardless of how we grouped federal agencies, plaintiffs prevailed roughly 33-42 percent of the time.
Similarly, under the Obama Administration only the USFS was a potential outlier, but plaintiffs prevailed just 30
percent more often than other federal agencies collectively (25 versus 19 percent, respectively). In essence, the data
reveal that plaintiffs’ success rates dropped roughly equivalently across all federal agencies during the Obama
Administration; this shift simply magnified the somewhat higher success rates against the USFS.
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than, say, the Department of Housing and Urban Development. The reason for this is obvious—
the scale of highway development and the environmental settings in which projects occur are
typically of a different order than a housing development in an urban setting. Figure 1 above
bears out this inference, but the degree to which NEPA litigation targets a handful of federal
agencies exceeded our expectations.113 About three-quarters of the district and circuit court cases
involved just five federal agencies, each of which either manages federal lands or has principal
authority for protecting natural resources.114 Equally striking, just two federal agencies, the
USFS and BLM, accounted for more than 50 percent of the district court cases.
Figure 1: Number of NEPA Cases by Federal Defendant 2001-15
Percent of NEPA Appeals by Federal Defendant
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While this concentration is driven in part by the large geographic scale and
environmental sensitivity of the public lands each agency manages, the share of cases filed
against these agencies nevertheless appears disproportionate. Many federal agencies routinely
undertake or oversee actions with large environmental impacts and yet are rarely subject to
lawsuits, notably agencies such as DOE, the Department of Defense, and the FHWA.115 Table 1
below provides a measure of the observed imbalance by comparing the percentage of the total
number of EISs issued nationally by prominent agencies against the percentage of the total
number of NEPA suits with EIS-related claims filed nationally against each of those agencies.
Table 1 shows that for all but the BLM, the relative litigation rates were much higher for the land

113

The distribution of cases across federal agencies was very similar for the statistical sample of cases we coded by
hand: USFS – 36 percent; Other Agencies – 28 percent; FWS & NMFS – 15 percent; BLM – 13 percent; and
USACE – 8.6 percent.
114
The appellate cases mirror the results for the district court cases, with federal land management and conservation
agencies dominating appeals. While it is true that appeals from cases involving USACE occurred at higher rates (6
percent of the district court cases versus 12 percent of the appeals) and appeals against the general class of “other
federal agencies” occurred at lower rates (28 percent of district cases but just 21 percent of appeals), we believe that
much of this difference is attributable to the variation in plaintiff success rates. For example, plaintiffs prevailed
against USACE (17 percent of the cases) at a lower rate than in cases involving all other federal agencies (29
percent), whereas plaintiffs won 36 percent of the cases involving “other federal agencies.”
115
Only the FHWA accounted for more than 5 percent of the district court cases filed, and it accounted for just about
6 percent if cases involving other agencies within DOT are included.
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management and natural resource conservation agencies, with the NMFS having a litigation rate
that was five times the share of EISs it issued.
Table 1: Comparison by Agency of Percent EISs vs. Percent EISs Litigated116
Agency
BLM
DOD
DOE
FERC
FHWA
FWS
NMFS
Other Agencies
USACE
USFS

EPA-EISs
11.6
5.4
2.7
3.3
8.2
3.9
1.4
32.1
9.6
21.7

Litigation Rates
11.44
3
1.91
3.54
2.18
7.08
7.36
28.34
4.36
30.79

Multiple
1.0
0.6
0.7
1.1
0.3
1.8
5.3
0.9
0.5
1.4

Accordingly, a central question raised by this and previous studies is why NEPA
litigation does not reflect the extraordinarily broad scope of the statute, and why it is
disproportionately used by plaintiffs to challenge decisions involving a handful of federal
agencies. We suspect that this finding derives from a combination of the exemptions to NEPA
for a variety of environmental programs, most notably under the Clean Air Act and Clean Water
Act,117 and the limited availability118 or perceived weakness of legal actions under the organic
statutes that govern public lands management and resource conservation in the U.S.119 Those
factors may induce litigants to challenge land management agency decisions on NEPA grounds
instead of or in addition to challenges based on substantive violations of the organic acts. 120
Strategically, plaintiffs may believe that courts will be less reluctant to find procedural violations
116

The EIS data are taken from the EPA EIS database that covers 2012-2016.
See 15 U.S.C. § 793(c)(1) (2012) (“No action taken under the Clean Air Act . . . shall be deemed a major Federal
action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment within the meaning of [NEPA].”); Portland
Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding that EPA need not comply with NEPA in
issuing standards of performance for new stationary sources under the Clean Air Act).
118
Courts are often unwilling to resolve challenges to programmatic decisions by the land management agencies.
See Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871 891 (1990) (alleged land withdrawal review program); see also
Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55 (2004) (holding that court may address allegations that agency
action was unlawfully withheld in suit brought under § 706(1) of the APA only if the relief sought is an order to take
discrete action that is legally required); Ohio Forestry Ass’n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726 (1998) (challenge to land
use plan not ripe).
119
There is a tradition of judicial deference to land management agency decisions, particularly decisions made by
the USFS and the BLM, which operate under an amorphous multiple use, sustained yield standard. See, e.g., Perkins
v. Bergland, 608 F.2d 803, 806 (9th Cir. 1975).
120
The availability of compelling claims under the Clean Water Act’s dredge and fill permit program, 33 U.S.C. §
1344 (2012), may be an example that at least partially explains why the USACE is a much less frequent defendant in
NEPA litigation than the USFS. Other agencies, such as the Departments of Defense and Energy, may be sued
relatively infrequently because of concerns that courts will be reluctant to enjoin activities with national security
implications, see, e.g., Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008) (refusing to enjoin naval training
exercises), or that, even if environmental plaintiffs prevail in court, Congress may enact appropriations riders
exempting the agencies from NEPA compliance.
117
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of NEPA than to second-guess the agencies on their substantive resource management
decisions.121
The focus of NEPA litigation on a small subset of federal agencies is mirrored in the
geographic distribution of cases across federal circuits. As noted earlier, most federal land is
located in western states, suggesting that on this basis alone one would expect cases to be filed
disproportionately in the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, which together encompass 99 percent of
BLM land, 85 percent of USFS land, and 91 percent of NPS land.122 We find that two-thirds of
the district court cases were filed in either the Ninth or Tenth Circuits and that 12 percent were
filed in the D.C. Circuit (see Figure 2).123 The distribution of appeals across circuits largely
matches the district court filings, albeit with somewhat higher rates of appeals in the Tenth
Circuit.124 At the state level, two-thirds of the cases were filed in just 10 states,125 and just four
states (California, Montana, Oregon, Arizona) and the District of Columbia accounted for half of
the cases. Only two states of the top 10, Florida and New York, were eastern states and each has
distinctive characteristics—Florida has many endangered species and wetlands (including the
Everglades),126 and New York has significant wetlands and very powerful environmental
interests. The D.C. Circuit is unique for a different reason: plaintiffs can use it as an alternative
venue to the circuit in which a federal action is located because most federal agencies are based
in D.C.127
In the Ninth and D.C. Circuits,128 the concentration of cases may also be influenced by
forum shopping. As discussed further below, plaintiffs prevailed in district court cases at
substantially higher rates in the Ninth and D.C. Circuits, and on appeal they prevailed at higher
rates in the Ninth Circuit. While the number of cases and success rates are suggestive, we found
121

We have anecdotal support for this inference based on conversations with Sharon Buccino, who is the Director
of the Land & Wildlife Program at the Natural Resources Defense Council in Washington, D.C. It is possible that
litigants with strong claims under environmental statutes other than NEPA see little downside to adding a NEPA
claim which they would not have thought worth litigating in isolation. Our data do not allow us to assess whether
litigants actually pursue this strategy.
122
The percentages for each circuit are as follows: the Ninth Circuit encompasses 72 percent of BLM land, 64
percent of USFS land, and 84 percent of NPS land; the Tenth Circuit encompasses 27 percent of BLM land, 22
percent of USFS land, and 7 percent of NPS land. Congressional Research Service, Federal Land Ownership:
Overview and Data 9-11, 21 (Mar. 3, 2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42346.pdf.
123
The distribution of cases across federal circuits was similar in our sample study: Ninth Circuit – 51 percent, Other
Circuits – 27 percent, D.C. Circuit – 12 percent; Sixth Circuit -- 3 percent; and the Tenth Circuit -- 7 percent.
124
The appeal rate in the Tenth Circuit was almost twice that of other circuits, as it accounted for 12 percent of the
appeals but just 6.7 percent of the district court cases. This cannot be explained by more aggressive litigation on the
part of environmental plaintiffs, as their rates of litigation do not differ from those in other circuits (64 percent
nationally versus 67 percent in the Tenth Circuit). Statistically, the small absolute number of appeals in the Tenth
Circuit, just 39 in total, may foreclose ruling out random variation.
125
The states are: Arizona, California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Florida, Idaho, Montana, New York, Oregon,
and Washington. Only Colorado, Florida, and New York are outside the Ninth or D.C. Circuits.
126
Florida also ranks 15th nationally with regard to the percentage (13.0) of federal land in the state. See Federal
Land Ownership: Overview and Data, supra note 122, at 7.
127
See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (2012) (providing that a civil action in which a defendant is the United States, a federal
agency, or an official of such an agency may be brought in any judicial district in which (a defendant in the action
resides).
128
The D.C. Circuit cases involved challenged activities that were located in 11 circuits with the highest number of
cases originating from the Fourth Circuit (4), Sixth Circuit (4), Tenth Circuit (5), and Eleventh Circuit (3).
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that less twelve percent of the cases, at either the district court or appellate level, involved federal
actions that spanned more than one circuit. Thus, while we observe a clear preference for the
Ninth and D.C. Circuits among the few cases involving government actions that spanned more
than one circuit,129 the limited numbers neutralize the potential impact of forum shopping. These
numerical limits do not, however, foreclose the lower success rates of plaintiffs in other federal
circuits from operating as a deterrent to NEPA challenges. If this were a significant factor, it
could depress the number of cases outside the Ninth and D.C. Circuits and exacerbate the
skewed distribution of NEPA cases geographically and by circuit. In either case, the net effect is
that most of the legal precedent under NEPA has evolved in the Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits,
but with the Ninth Circuit clearly the dominant one of the three.130
Figure 2: Number of NEPA District and Appellate Cases by Circuit 2001-15
Number of District Court Cases by Circuit 2001-2015
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The concentration of cases in three circuits has the potential to result in their precedents
shaping the evolution of legal doctrines under NEPA nationally. One might also expect the
predominance of certain kinds of agency actions in these circuits to reinforce this effect, as the
types of claims and facts at issue would frame the context in which legal doctrines are
developed. Somewhat surprisingly, we do not observe any systemic patterns associated with the
variation in the frequency of claims brought against specific federal agencies or within certain
circuits. Moreover, to the extent we do observe significant differences across circuits with regard
to plaintiffs’ success rates, these differences were not associated with particular legal doctrines or
claims.
The absence of variation in the claims raised across agencies and circuits is consistent
with the lack of variation we observe in the success rates for different NEPA claims. While a
subset of claims tends to predominate in the district court cases, irrespective of circuit or agency,
none stands out as favoring or disfavoring plaintiffs. The most common challenges focused on
the alternatives considered in an EA or EIS, the cumulative impacts of a federal action,
129

Together, the two Circuits accounted over our sample period for about 85 percent of the district court and 75
percent of appellate cases involving governments that spanned more than one circuit.
130
Over the 15 years covered by the study, only the Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits had more than 31 district court
cases or more than 25 appellate cases. These estimates are based on the auto-coding of cases and thus represent
upper bounds on the actual number of cases filed in each circuit at the district and appellate levels.
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mitigation measures contemplated by an agency, and the scope of the NEPA analysis (see Tables
2 & 3 in the Appendix). These four classes of claims, along with challenges to uses of
categorical exclusions and demands for supplemental EISs, were the only substantive claims
raised in more than 10 percent of the district court cases. The sole exception to this rule were
claims challenging plaintiffs’ constitutional standing to sue; although the single most frequently
claim litigated (see Table 4 in the Appendix), they rarely succeeded.131
The appellate cases also displayed a similar lack of variation in the frequency of claims
filed across federal agencies and circuits. The rates at which specific claims were appealed
largely followed their frequency in the district court cases;132 in essence, the same small number
of NEPA claims raised at the district court level reappear in the appeals (see Tables 7 & 8 in the
Appendix). The four classes of challenges noted above to the content of EAs and EISs, along
with claims requesting supplemental EISs, were the only substantive claims raised in more than
10 percent of the appeals. Constitutional standing was also the single most frequent issue
litigated (see Table 7 in the Appendix), but it was once again exceedingly rare for defendants to
succeed with such challenges.133 The circuit court cases therefore reinforce the district court
findings—a subset of claims tends to predominate in NEPA cases but no single claim or
collection of claims had a substantially greater likelihood of succeeding and none was
statistically significant.134
The NEPA claims raised most frequently were, by in large, the ones most commentators
would predict. Their attractiveness to plaintiffs has several elements. Perhaps most importantly,
these claims challenge the fundamental legitimacy of an agency’s analysis—the alternatives
analysis, for example, is viewed by courts as the “heart of the NEPA process.”135 Similarly,
failure to consider cumulative impacts,136 or reliance on improper or poorly described mitigation
methods,137 can be determinative of whether NEPA applies and what level of analysis, an EA or
EIS, is required. Moreover, at least some of legal doctrines (such as the adequacy of alternatives
analysis) has the virtue that they are less likely to implicate complex technical details that are
difficult for courts to assess and thus may receive a higher degree of judicial scrutiny. On the
other hand, segmentation claims, which are conceptually close cousins of cumulative impacts,
are rare—a mere 2 percent of the cases. This finding is significant because it runs counter to the
131

We found that constitutional standing was a basis for the court’s ruling in roughly 6 percent of the cases.
The only notable exception was challenges to “findings of no significant impact,” so called “FONSI” claims,
which occurred twice as often in appeals (36 percent of the cases) as they did at the district court level (13 percent of
the cases). However, the higher rate of FONSI claims tracked the higher rate of appeals for challenging EAs. It may
be that plaintiffs believe that EAs are easier to challenge given that, by definition, the environmental reviews they
contain are more superficial; however, we do not see any basis for such a view in our data. As an additional check,
we included FONSI and EA claims as a dummy variable in the regression discussed below and did not find them to
be statistically significant predictors of success in NEPA appeals.
133
We found that constitutional standing was a basis for the court’s ruling in favor of agency defendants in roughly
5 percent of the appeals.
134
This finding is based on a combination of analyses based on Chi2 tests and logistic regressions conducted using
dummy variables for each of the most common claims (alternatives, cumulative impacts, mitigation measure, and
scope). It is important to note that the small number of cases for many claims was a limiting factor statistically.
135
See Union Neighbors United, Inc. v. Jewell, 831 F.3d 564, 575 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14).
136
See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(2) (2016).
137
See Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain v. U.S. Forest Serv., 137 F.3d 1372, 1381-82 (9th Cir. 1998).
132
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importance that many scholars have attached to segmentation as a barrier to effective
implementation of NEPA, but may be explained by less favorable case law on segmentation than
on cumulative impacts or by the likelihood that if a litigant can raise a segmentation claim, it can
also couch it in terms of insufficient cumulative impact analysis.138
Figure 3: Duration of NEPA Litigation in District Courts
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The final descriptive statistics that we examined were the rates at which cases settled and
the duration of NEPA litigation.139 Using subsamples taken from cases filed during the Bush and
Obama Administrations, we found that 40 percent of the district court cases were either settled or
dismissed during the Bush Administration versus 29 percent during the Obama
Administration.140 Plaintiffs were therefore both much less likely to prevail in their NEPA claims
138

See, e.g., Mark A. Chertok, Overview of the National Environmental Policy Act: Environmental Impact
Assessment and Alternatives, SR045 ALI-ABA 757 , 773 (2010) (“While segmentation per se is not unlawful, courts
are skeptical of attempts to divide projects into segments in order to circumvent the mandate of NEPA.”); MaryKaitlin E. Rigney, Clogging the Pipeline: Exploring the D.C. Circuit's Improper Segmentation Analysis in Delaware
Riverkeeper Network v. FERC and Its Implications for the United States’s Domestic Natural Gas Production, 64
AM. U. L. REV. 1465, 1479 (2015) “[T]the rule against segmentation has developed through common law to prevent
agencies from dividing overall plans into component-parts and thereby avoiding the NEPA requirement of a
comprehensive EIS.”); see generally Robert D. Comer, NEPA Compliance in Oil and Gas Leasing: Lease Hold
Segmentation and the Decision to Forego an Environmental Impact Statement, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 677 (1988).
139
To gain a statistical measure of the duration of NEPA litigation, we used a sample of roughly 300 NEPA cases
litigated during the Bush Administration.
140
Determining settlement rates is difficult. “No single, agreed method of computing settlement rates exists because
judgment calls exist how about to translate a range of formal case outcomes into the dichotomous characterization of
settled or not settled. There may not even be a single ‘best’ measure of the settlement rate.” Theodore Eisenberg &
Charlotte Lanvers, What is the Settlement Rate and Why Should We Care?, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111, 114
(2009). One study found that about 70% of federal court cases in a database maintained by the Administrative Office
of U.S. Courts that terminated between 1979 and 2006 settled. Id. at 116 (citing Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J.
Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, Cornell Law Faculty
Publications (2009), http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/lsrp_papers/109/). See generally Daniel P. Kessler & Daniel
L. Rubinfeld, Empirical Study of the Civil Justice System, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW & ECONOMICS 381–83 (A.
Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds. 2007) (reviewing empirical settlement literature).
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and less likely to settle during the Obama Administration. If the average case during the Obama
Administration were weaker than the average during the Bush Administration, this shift could
simply reflect the weaker cohort of cases rather than a decision by the Obama Administration to
raise the bar for entering into settlements. We believe that the disparity in settlement rates
supports the inference that NEPA compliance was more lax during the Bush Administration for
the simple reason that one would expect, all other factors being equal, that an administration with
weak environmental commitments would be more likely to adopt a hardline strategy that views
settlement as an option of last resort.141 Yet, we observe just the opposite—higher settlement
rates during the Bush Administration—suggesting that the level of NEPA compliance was often
sufficiently low to compel lawyers during the Bush Administration to settle.
Our data on the duration of NEPA litigation were limited to the Bush Administration. While
we would have preferred to have data covering both administrations, we do not expect that the
length of litigation is likely to change substantially between administrations, as it is largely
dictated by either the courts or the plaintiffs—in part, because federal agencies so rarely appeal
NEPA cases.142 That may be because the time needed to conduct a new NEPA study may not
differ significantly than the anticipated length of litigation. At any rate, duration is a key variable
practically and politically because one of the recurring critiques leveled against NEPA is that its
procedures and the litigation surrounding them has undermined federal programs by unduly
burdening decision-making processes. By the standards of federal administrative litigation,143 we
find weak evidence for these claims (see Figure 3). The median duration of a NEPA case was
less than 2 years (23 months), and 75 percent of the cases were resolved within 3.2 years (39
months). Moreover, for the subset of cases in which the federal government prevailed, the
median duration was just 1.5 years and 75 percent of the cases were resolved within 3 years (36
months).144
The descriptive statistics alone allow us to reject our hypotheses that procedural claims
are more likely to succeed and that suits against federal agencies with higher rates of NEPA
litigation are less likely to succeed (hypotheses 8 and 10). We do find evidence that case
outcomes are influenced by the presidential administration, circuit in which a suit is filed, and
class of plaintiff at the district and appellate court levels (hypotheses 6, 7, and 9). However, the
141

This inference is reinforced by the substantially higher success rates of environmental plaintiffs during the Bush
Administration. See infra at Part II.B.
142
In our appellate sample, federal agencies were the appellee in less than three percent of the cases.
143
See Mark A. Fellows & Roger S. Haydock, Federal Court Special Masters: A Vital Resource in the Era of
Complex Litigation, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1269, 1289 (2005) (citing U.S. Courts, Federal Court Management
Statistics, Judicial Caseload Profile Report 2003, http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federal-courtmanagement-statistics-2003) (finding that the average duration of a federal civil case from filing to trial increased
from 19.5 to 22.5 months between 1998 and 2003); Jessica Kier, Raising the Bar: How Will the New Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure Affect Your Required Level of Competency?, 39 J. LEGAL PROF. 103, 105 (2014) (reporting that
the median duration for securities class-action lawsuits was three and a half years); Kathryn Moss et al., Prevalence
and Outcomes of ADA Employment Discrimination Claims in the Federal Courts, 29 MENTAL & PHYSICAL
DISABILITY L. REP. 303, 307 (2005) (“Between 1990 and 1998, the percentage of general federal civil rights cases
resolved within two years increased from 82 percent to 88 percent . . . .”).
144
For cases in which the federal government wins, 50 percent of the cases are resolved within about 1.5 years; 75
percent resolved within 3 years; 90 percent of the cases are resolved within 5 years. For cases in which the plaintiff
prevails on at least one claim, 50 percent of the cases are resolved within 2.5 years; 75 percent resolved within about
4.3 years; and 90 percent of the cases are resolved within 6.2 years.
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descriptive statistics do not include any controls and thus on their own are inconclusive. In the
subsection that follows, we discuss multiple regressions that include the potential explanatory
variables along with several key control variables.
B. The Influence of Presidential Politics, Federal Circuit, and Judicial Ideology on
the Outcome of NEPA Cases
We conducted a variety of statistical tests and subdivided the sample data along several
dimensions, most notably by Circuit, presidential administration, federal agency, and judicial
ideology,145 to test our starting hypotheses about their impact on case outcomes. This analysis
provides strong evidence for the influence of presidential politics, judicial ideology, and the
circuit in which a case is filed, but consistent with the results above, no evidence that the federal
agency or specific NEPA claims were significant factors. At the highest level of aggregation, we
find large differences in outcomes between cases filed during the Bush Administration and those
filed during the Obama Administration. Specifically, plaintiffs were almost twice as likely to win
at the district court level during the Bush Administration than the Obama Administration, and
they were 75 percent more likely to win at the appellate level.146 This result supports our
hypothesis that NEPA compliance was less rigorous during the Bush Administration (hypothesis
3), but there are other important factors that could be at play and that must be considered.
Statistically and practically significant impacts were clearly associated with the circuit of
origin. Plaintiffs were more than twice as likely to prevail at the district court level in the Ninth
and D.C. Circuits relative to other circuits (collectively) during the Bush Administration,147 and
they continued to prevail almost twice as often in the Ninth Circuit during the Obama
Administration, albeit at a lower absolute rate.148 On appeal, only the Ninth Circuit was a more
favorable venue, with plaintiffs prevailing 31 percent of the time versus 14 percent in other
circuits collectively.149 However, unlike the district court cases, the advantage of filing an appeal
in the Ninth Circuit disappeared statistically during the Obama Administration—dropping from a
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Judicial ideology was defined by the party of the appointing president: judges appointed by Republican
presidents were designated as Republican judges; judges appointed by Democratic presidents were designated as
Democratic judges. The party of the appointing president is a rough proxy for judicial ideology, but it has the virtue
that it errs on the side of obscuring the impact of ideology because the party of the appointing president does not
necessarily reflect the ideology of the judge. Accordingly, if we observe a statistically significant effect it is likely to
be a lower bound on the actual influence of ideology.
146
Plaintiffs won 39 percent of the district court cases during the Bush Administration versus 20 percent of the
district court cases during the Obama Administration. At the appellate level, plaintiffs won 28 percent of the cases
during the Bush Administration versus 16 percent of the cases during the Obama Administration.
147
At the district court level, plaintiffs succeeded at a relatively high rate, 35 percent of the cases, in Tenth Circuit
cases during the Bush Administration and at a relatively high rate overall, 28 percent of the cases; however, on
appeal plaintiffs were much less likely to prevail in the Tenth Circuit than other circuits, 5 percent versus about 17
percent for all circuits excluding the Ninth Circuit.
148
During the Bush Administration, plaintiffs won about 45 percent of the cases in the Ninth and D.C. Circuits
versus 23 percent of the cases in all other circuits; during the Obama Administration, plaintiffs won 24 percent of
the cases in the Ninth Circuit versus 14 percent of the cases in all other circuits, including the D.C. Circuit.
149
Here, too, the disparity was much greater during the Bush Administration (40 percent in the Ninth Circuit versus
16 percent in other circuits collectively) than the Obama Administration (19 versus 13 percent, respectively).
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factor of 2.8 to 1.38.150 Given the absence of statistically significant differences across federal
agencies, this finding suggests that district judges in the Ninth Circuit were less deferential than
district judges in other circuits during both administrations, whereas Ninth Circuit appellate and
D.C. Circuit district judges were less deferential only during the Bush Administration. We
believe that these shifts in case outcomes were likely associated with the number of cases,
circuit-level dynamics, and the balance of Democratic- and Republican-appointed judges in each
circuit; Part III discusses this and other related issues in detail.
The influence of judicial ideology on case outcomes is both more complex, particularly at
the appellate level, and less pronounced than the impact of circuit and presidential politics. At
the district court level, the difference in plaintiff success rates between judges appointed by a
Republican president and judges appointed by a Democratic president was statistically and
practically significant, respectively 31 versus 48 percent, during the Bush Administration;
however, it dropped to 14 and 24 percent, respectively, during the Obama Administration and
was no longer statistically significant. In short, the influence of judicial ideology changed with
the shift in presidential politics—it was high when the conservative ideology of the Bush
Administration was in tension with the liberal environmental statutory mandate of NEPA and
relatively modest when NEPA policies were aligned with the priorities of the Obama
Administration.
At the appellate level, the influence of judicial ideology was complicated by the
permutations of three-judge panels. Similar to prior studies of judicial ideology in appellate
courts, we observed the greatest differences in case outcomes when panels were ideologically
uniform, either all Republican or all Democratic appointees, whereas ideologically mixed panels
moderated case outcomes.151 During the Bush Administration, plaintiffs prevailed twice as often
before a majority-Democratic panel as before a majority-Republican panel and four times the
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Plaintiffs in the Ninth Circuit during the Bush Administration prevailed in 42 percent of the NEPA cases versus
15 percent in all other circuits collectively; during the Obama Administration, plaintiff success rates dropped to 18
and 15 percent, respectively.
151
See, e.g., Kevin M. Quinn, The Academic Study of Decision Making on Multimember Courts, 100 CAL. L. REV.
1493, 1494 (2012) (asserting that “judges decide some types of cases differently depending on the identities of their
colleagues on a panel”); Pauline T. Kim, Deliberation and Strategy on the United States Courts of Appeals: An
Empirical Exploration of Panel Effects, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1319, 1328 (2009) (finding that “the tendency of appeals
court judges to be influenced by their panel colleagues does depend on how the preferences of the circuit court as a
whole are aligned relative to those of the panel members.”); Miles & Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy,
supra note 18, at 823 (concluding that “[i]n lower court decisions involving the EPA and the NLRB from 1990 to
2004, Republican appointees demonstrated a greater willingness to invalidate liberal agency decisions and those of
Democratic administrations. These differences are greatly amplified when Republican appointees sit with two
Republican appointees and when Democratic appointees sit with two Democratic appointees.”); Sunstein et al.,
supra note 18, at 301 (finding “ideological dampening” and “ideological amplification” in a wide variety of federal
cases); Revesz, supra note 18, at 1764 (1997) (concluding that “while individual ideology and panel composition
both have important effects on a judge’s vote, the ideology of one’s colleagues is a better predictor of one’s vote
than one’s own ideology”); Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Essay, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to
Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155 (1998) (concluding that
judges' votes were influenced not only by their political affiliation, but also by the composition of the panel on
which they sat); Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 53 (2008)
(finding that the ideology of other judges on the panel affects judges’ votes in Voting Rights Act cases).
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rate before an all-Republican panel.152 Similar to the circuit effects, the impact of judicial
ideology diminished during the Obama Administration, with plaintiff success rates converging to
9-13 percent for both all-Republican and ideologically mixed panels. The one exception was
plaintiff success rates before all-Democratic panels, which declined only modestly during the
Obama Administration.153 While we cannot know whether the long-term baseline is closer to the
level observed during the Bush or Obama Administrations,154 the relative influence of judicial
ideology as measured by the difference between majority-Democratic and majority-Republican
panels is striking and may be generalizable to statutes that reflect traditionally conservative
issues (e.g., immigration, regulatory reform, school choice) as well. The relative invariance of
all-Democratic panels is also notable and suggests that Democratic judges are less deferential to
agencies regardless of the administration.
One important difference to note between the district court and appellate cases is that
federal defendants can initiate appeals. Of the 342 appellate cases in our sample, 24 of them were
initiated by federal or private defendants or involved a cross appeal. Although representing less
than 10 percent of the appeals, these cases are notable for their relatively high success rates—
whereas plaintiffs won just 20 percent of the appeals they initiated, defendants won 38 percent of
their appeals.155 Thus a defendant-initiated appeal was almost twice as likely to succeed as one
initiated by a plaintiff. One must be careful, however, when interpreting these results because the
small number of defendant-initiated appeals could reflect a high bar for pursuing appeals,156
thereby strictly limiting appeals to cases with a high likelihood of succeeding. Nevertheless,
because such judgments are made against adverse lower court rulings and often complex factual
settings, it would take exceptionally good case selection to account for the dramatically different
success rates. Accordingly, we suspect that the difference in case outcomes may also reflect a
heightened level of deference appellate courts apply when a federal agency is the appellee, and
that this may partially offset the weight circuit judges give to a lower court’s ruling.

152

Before a majority-Republican panel, plaintiffs prevailed in 20 percent of the cases and in just 5 percent of the
cases before an all-Republican panel; by contrast, plaintiffs won 41 percent of their appeals before all- or majorityDemocratic judge panels.
153
For all-Democratic panels, plaintiffs prevailed at roughly the same rates over both administrations—41 versus 33
percent, which was a similar degree of convergence observed at the district court level. By contrast, all-Republican
panels displayed a greater level of deference towards the Bush Administration (ruling in its favor in 95 percent of
the cases) and converged to the rates of mixed panels during the Obama Administration (9-13 percent). The small
number of cases with ideologically uniform judges limits the inferences we can draw from the results.
154
At least one earlier study suggests that the average is closer to rates observed during the Obama Administration.
Malmsheimer et al., supra note 95, at 22 (finding that the USFS prevailed in 64 percent of the NEPA cases during
the George H.W. Bush Administration and 80 percent of the cases during the Clinton Administration).
155
We have lumped together all of the instances in which an appeal is at least partly initiated by a federal or private
defendant due to the small number of such cases in our sample. There may be significant differences between the
subsets of cases—in particular, defendants other than federal agencies actually prevailed at a higher rate than federal
defendants, 44 versus 33 percent of the cases they appealed.
156
Federal defendants won 71 percent of the district court cases, but defendants filed less than 7 percent of the
appeals in the sample. This disparity implies that defendants filed only about a quarter of the appeals predicted based
on the number of their losses in district court.
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Table 2: Logistic Regression for District Court Case Outcomes
(1)
Ruling

(2)
Ruling

(3)
Ruling

(4)
Ruling

(5)
Ruling

Administration

0.379***
(-4.27)

0.374***
(-4.34)

0.362***
(-4.53)

0.399***
(-4.34)

0.379***
(-4.64)

D.C. Circuit157

1.771
(1.47)

1.620
(1.26)

1.757
(1.49)

1.867
(1.67)

1.914
(1.75)

Ninth Circuit

2.831***
(3.64)

2.607***
(3.51)

2.468***
(3.37)

2.320**
(3.22)

2.576***
(3.69)

National Environmental
Organization

2.614**
(3.07)

2.476**
(2.93)

2.539**
(3.02)

2.777***
(3.40)

1.695*
(2.30)

Local Environmental
Organization

2.080*
(2.49)

1.945*
(2.36)

1.972*
(2.42)

2.092**
(2.70)

Appointing President’s
Party for Judge

1.904**
(2.83)

1.809**
(2.64)

1.851**
(2.76)

Case Published

1.382
(1.37)

1.375
(1.35)

Federal Lands Agency

0.797
(-0.84)

Federal Natural Resource
Management Agency

0.546
(-1.68)

N

462

462

462

462

462

Exponentiated coefficients; z statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

We conducted multiple regressions using the district and appellate court data.158 Table 2
displays the results from five logistic regressions using a range of parameters to test the
statistical significance and influence of key variables relative to each other. The dependent
variable in each regression is case outcome, where success was defined as a plaintiff prevailing
157

The baseline for the likelihood ratio is the odds of a plaintiff winning a NEPA case at the district court level in
one of the circuits other than the Ninth and D.C. Circuits.
158
Because the dependent variable—whether the plaintiff prevailed on at least one of its NEPA claims—was
categorical, logistic regression was used in place of conventional ordinary-least-squares regression. ALAN C.
ACOCK, A GENTLE INTRODUCTION TO STATA 302-04 (3rd ed., 2012). This type of regression generates a “likelihood”
or “odds” ratio, which in our analysis is simply the ratio of the likelihood of a plaintiff prevailing when the value of
the applicable dummy variable is “one” over the likelihood when it is “zero.” For example, the dummy variable
presidential administration in our analysis designates the Bush Administration as “0” and the Obama Administration
as “1.” Accordingly, the likelihood ratio is the odds of a plaintiff winning its case during the Obama Administration
over the odds of a plaintiff prevailing during the Bush Administration. In this case, a likelihood ratio of “0.5”
implies that a plaintiff has a 50 percent lower chance of winning a NEPA suit during the Obama Administration than
during the Bush Administration; conversely, a likelihood ratio of “1.5” implies that a plaintiff has a 50 percent
greater chance of prevailing during the Obama Administration.
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on at least one of its NEPA claims. Likelihood ratios for plaintiff success rates appear above the
z-values,159 which are in brackets, and the asterisks indicate the degree of statistical significance
for each parameter. We also conducted additional regressions to assess whether specific NEPA
claims were predictive of case outcome. Only one type of claim, challenges to mitigation
measures in an EIS, generated results that were remotely close to being statistically significant;
however, the effect was weak and the lack of statistical significance led us to drop it in the final
set of regressions.160
All five logistic regressions in Table 2 indicate that plaintiffs’ success rates at the district
court level were influenced strongly by the presidential administration, whether the case was
filed in the Ninth Circuit,161 and whether the plaintiff was an environmental organization.162
Plaintiffs were less than half as likely to succeed in a NEPA action during the Obama
administration than during the Bush Administration; they were roughly 2.5 times more likely to
succeed in the Ninth Circuit; and plaintiffs were 2 to 2.5 times more likely to prevail if they were
a local or national environmental organization.163 Although the magnitude of the effect was
lower, the regressions show that the political affiliation of the district judge influenced case
outcomes, with judges appointed by a democratic president 80 percent more likely to rule in
favor of a plaintiff. By contrast, the defendant federal agency (focusing here on the federal lands
and natural resource management agencies) was not a statistically significant factor.
These results confirm the association of presidential administration, class of plaintiff,
circuit, and judicial ideology with the outcomes of district court cases. We conducted regressions
with interaction terms to test whether the variables operated independently; none of the
interaction terms was found to be statistically significant, which means that there was no
evidence that the variables were influencing each other. The statistical significance and
independence of the circuit variable implies that inter-circuit differences cannot be reduced to the
ideology of judges—some structural feature of the circuits must also be at work. These dynamics
are particularly novel because they reflect both absolute and relative changes in the rates at
which plaintiffs prevailed before Democratic and Republican judges. In Part III we will argue
that this combination of absolute and relative changes in case outcomes is driven by the degree
of alignment between the ideology of the judge, the liberal values of NEPA, and the politics of
the presidential administration in power. Misalignment of presidential politics with NEPA’s
goals is found to magnify the influence of judicial ideology on case outcomes.

159

A “z-value” is a complementary measure of statistical significance that indicates the number of standard
deviations the observed data deviate from the value predicted by the statistical model.
160
The association was also negative—mitigation claims were about 40 percent less likely to succeed than average.
161
The statistical significance of the coefficient for the D.C. Circuit may have been limited by statistical power.
Only 60 cases were filed in the D.C. Circuit, which while large relative to most circuits, was small for purposes of
statistical power—for our data, the statistical power was less than 60 for any sample with fewer than 94 cases.
162
The dummy variable designating whether or not a case was published was included as a control variable.
163
The success rates of environmental plaintiffs diverged somewhat across administrations—national environmental
organizations had higher success rates than local ones (53 versus 40 percent, respectively) during the Bush
Administration but they converged during the Obama Administration (25 and 21 percent, respectively).
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Table 3: Logistic Regression for Appeals Outcome
(1)
Ruling

(2)
Ruling

(3)
Ruling

(4)
Ruling

(5)
Ruling

Other CircuitsNinth Circuit

2.171*
(2.22)

2.294*
(2.43)

2.757**
(3.25)

3.054***
(3.62)

3.646***
(4.31)

Administration164

0.553
(-1.95)

0.537*
(-2.06)

0.572
(-1.89)

0.555*
(-2.00)

0.516*
(-2.28)

Case Published165

2.742**
(2.63)

2.646*
(2.56)

2.611*
(2.56)

2.724**
(2.69)

3.286**
(3.24)

Hard Look

0.441*
(-2.37)

0.448*
(-2.33)

0.442*
(-2.43)

0.473*
(-2.26)

0.422**
(-2.63)

Appellee

0.210**
(-2.86)

0.219**
(-2.81)

0.223**
(-2.94)

0.259**
(-2.72)

Environmental
Organization

1.953
(1.94)

2.094*
(2.21)

2.032*
(2.17)

Circuit Panel
3-Reps

0.730
(-0.52)

0.770
(-0.43)

Circuit Panel
1-Rep/2-Dems

1.283
(0.68)

1.291
(0.70)

Circuit Panel
3-Dems

2.207
(1.81)

2.247
(1.86)

Federal Land
Agency

1.317
(0.86)

N

330

330

334

334

334

Exponentiated coefficients; z statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

The regressions for the appellate cases appear in Table 3 above. The dependent variable
in each regression is again case outcome, with success defined as a plaintiff prevailing on at least
one of its NEPA claims. The other statistics in Table 3 mirror those of Table 2 apart from
judicial ideology, which treats the four different combinations of three judges separately using
panels with two Republican-appointed judges and one Democratic-appointed judge as the
baseline against which the likelihood ratios for the other three panels are calculated. Similar to
the district court cases, we conducted multiple regressions on specific NEPA claims, only one of
164

The time lag associated with appeals makes it more difficult to define when one administration stops and another
begins, as an appeal may originate in actions that occurred in a prior administration. We experimented with different
cutoff dates and found overall relatively minor differences in the results. As a consequence, we adopted a “middle of
the road” approach that defines the Bush Administration as encompassing all Circuit cases filed between 2002 and
2009, and the Obama Administration as encompassing all cases filed between 2010 and 2015.
165
Whether the case was published is a control variable, but it does not change the results significantly if it is
excluded. The principal impact is on the Ninth Circuit variable, which falls below statistical significance if
publication is removed. The coefficients for other independent variables change only modestly.
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which, whether an agency took a “hard look” at the environmental impacts of a federal action,
was statistically significant. Consideration of whether an agency took a hard look reduced the
likelihood of a plaintiff prevailing by more than 50 percent. However, judges used the hard look
rubric in a generic manner that raises questions of endogeneity—judges convinced on
independent technical grounds about the adequacy of an agency’s analysis often ended their
analysis by concluding that the agency had undertaken the required hard look. With regard to
other NEPA claims, the smaller sample size for our appellate database and the low rates at which
most were raised limited the statistical power of our analysis.
The regression coefficients in Table 3 for the Ninth Circuit and environmental plaintiffs
are each statistically and practically significant. On appeal, plaintiffs were roughly 2.5 times
more likely to win in the Ninth Circuit; similarly, environmental plaintiffs were about two times
more likely to prevail than other classes of plaintiffs, although the statistical significance of this
finding was weaker. The coefficient for presidential administration was practically significant -plaintiffs were about half as likely to succeed on appeal during the Obama Administration
relative to the Bush Administration – but it was at the margin for statistical significance. Given
that our sample includes over 340 cases and is almost equally divided between the Bush and
Obama Administrations, this is unlikely to be a problem of limited statistical power.166 We
therefore cannot confidently reject the possibility that the observed inter-administration disparity
in case outcomes was a product of random variation. Finally, the identity of the appellee,
whether it was a defendant or plaintiff, is also a significant factor despite the small number of
appeals initiated by defendants (a total of 23 cases); plaintiffs were only about one-fourth as
likely to prevail on appeal as defendants.
The results of the regression for the appellate cases differ from those of the lower courts
with respect to the influence of presidential administration and judicial ideology. These
differences derive largely from the structural differences at the appellate level. First, the added
layer of case selection (only about a quarter of NEPA cases was appealed) narrows the range of
cases based on likelihood of success.167 Thus, while the number of cases that could be appealed
may have been higher during the Bush Administration, the likelihood of prevailing may change
very little if appellees selected cases with similar likelihoods of succeeding during both
administrations.168 The weak statistical significance of the coefficient for presidential
administration is consistent with these selection effects. Second, the role of ideology on threejudge panels is complicated both because judges with divergent ideologies influence each other
and because a strong norm of unanimity exists among circuit judges.169 Together, these
166

We conducted a power analysis on the data using a two-tailed test and the “powerlog” command in Stata; it
estimated that a sample size of 112 would have a power of 0.90.
167
Theodore Eisenberg, Testing the Selection Effect: A New Theoretical Framework with Empirical Tests,
19 J. LEGAL STUD. 337, 337-38 (1990) [hereinafter Selection Effect]; Theodore Eisenberg, Why Do Plaintiffs Lose
Appeals? Biased Trial Courts, Litigious Losers, or Low Trial Win Rates, 15 AM. L. ECON. REV. 73, 105 (2013);
John M. de Figueiredo, Strategic Plaintiffs and Ideological Judges in Telecommunications Litigation, 21 J. L. ECON.
ORG. 501, 503-04 (2005).
168
Eisenberg, Selection Effect, supra note 167, at 338 (affirming the importance of selection effects on appeal).
169
This norm is clearly evident in our sample data: dissents were filed in just 5.5% of the cases. See Sean Farhang &
Gregory Wawro, Institutional Dynamics on the U.S. Court of Appeals: Minority Representation Under Panel
Decision Making, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 299, 307 (2004) (observing that the norm of consensus on appellate panels

34

differences tend to reduce the influence of judicial ideology on mixed panels, which predominate
in circuits with relatively balanced numbers of judges based on political affiliation. A moderation
of ideological influence is precisely what we observe—only modest differences in the
coefficients for ideologically mixed panels that lack statistical significance.170 Interestingly, the
results for ideologically uniform panels were mixed: the coefficient for all Republican-appointed
panels does not differ meaningfully in absolute terms whereas the one for all Democraticappointed panels is higher by a factor of two; unfortunately, the statistical power was limited in
both cases by the small sample sizes.171 In sum, the only cases for which judicial ideology could
be a significant factor at the appellate level were those with all Democratic-appointed judges on
the panel.172
Three factors at the appellate level remain important—whether the case was filed in the
Ninth Circuit, whether the plaintiff was an environmental organization, and whether the appellee
was a defendant. The persistence of circuit effects at the appellate level in the Ninth Circuit
highlights the importance of a circuit having a large share of the cases because the number of
cases with ideologically uniform three-judge panels scales with the total number of cases.173
Further, if there is an imbalance in the number of Republican and Democratic judges in a circuit,
this will elevate the number of panels dominated by judges with the political affiliation in the
majority. The Ninth Circuit is an outlier on both counts—it heard more than 50 percent of the
NEPA appeals and 59 percent of its appellate judges were appointed by Democratic
presidents.174 With these statistics, it should come as no surprise that 65 percent of the NEPA
appeals nationally with majority-Democratic panels and 83 percent of those with all Democraticappointed panels were in the Ninth Circuit. Moreover, within the Ninth Circuit 73 percent of the
NEPA appeals were heard by majority Democratic-appointee panels and 25 percent were heard
by all Democratic-appointee panels (roughly double the rate, on average, if there were equal
numbers of Democratic- and Republican-appointed judges).175 Accordingly, the elevated success
rates of plaintiffs on appeal were driven by rudimentary statistics associated with the Ninth
Circuit’s location in the western United States, large geographic scale, and bias towards
Democratic-appointed appellate judges.

stems from “a view among judges that unanimous court opinions promote the appearance of legal objectivity,
certainty, and neutrality, which fosters courts’ institutional legitimacy”).
170
The baseline for the regression is a panel with two Republican-appointed judges and one Democratic. The results
in Table 3 show that the increase in plaintiff success rate above this baseline for a panel with two Democraticappointed judges and one Republican is less than 30 percent and that it is not statistically significant.
171
Because of the adverse combinatorics, uniform panels were relatively rare in our sample, representing 37 and 52
cases for the all Republican-appointed and all Democratic-appointed panels, respectively.
172
While the coefficient in the regression is not statistically significant at the 5 percent level, a much larger study
would have to be conducted to achieve the necessary statistical power given that fifteen years of data produced just
52 cases with all Democratic-appointed panels. However, the sample size, which represents roughly two-thirds of
the 2001-15 appeals, gives us sufficient confidence to treat the coefficient as meaningful and not a statistical fluke.
173
By contrast, the small number of NEPA cases heard in most circuits (typically less than one case per year)
reduces the probability of having more than a couple of ideologically uniform panels to essentially zero.
174
In our full sample, 49 percent of the judges were appointed by Democratic presidents and 51 percent were
appointed by Republican presidents. The split in D.C. Circuit was close to the national average—47 versus 53
percent for Democratic- and Republican-appointed judges, respectively; however, the split in Tenth Circuit was 41
versus 59 percent for Democratic- and Republican-appointed judges, respectively.
175
By contrast, only a single appeal was heard by an all Democratic-appointed panel in the D.C., Tenth, or Sixth
Circuits, which were the only other circuits with more than 15 cases in our sample.
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The statistics for appeals initiated by defendants are similarly skewed towards the Ninth
Circuit, which heard 83 percent of these appeals, as well as the Bush Administration, during
which 75 percent of the defendant-initiated appeals were filed. However, all Democraticappointed panels were only modestly over-represented in the defendant-initiated appeals and the
absolute number (five cases) was small. Ultimately, the limited number of defendant-initiated
appeals limits what we can infer beyond that defendants appear to have a significant advantage
over plaintiffs on appeal. The final factor, the higher success rates of environmental plaintiffs on
appeal, is important because it underscores the relative merits of their claims and thus provides
further evidence against assertions that environmental plaintiffs file NEPA lawsuits for purely
strategic ends and in spite of the dubious legal grounds for their claims.
III. Implications for NEPA, Judicial Review, and Administrative Procedure
This section examines the implications of our results for the debates surrounding NEPA,
factors that determine the influence of judicial ideology in administrative challenges, and the
limits of augmented administrative procedures. Subsection A reassesses common critiques of
NEPA and the litigation surrounding it in light of our findings. Subsection B describes and
proposes a conceptual framework for understanding the interplay we observe between
presidential politics and the influence of ideology during judicial review. Finally, subsection C
discusses the implications of our findings for other forms of augmented administrative
procedures, focusing on enhanced procedures reflected in the recent proliferation of executive
orders and pending legislation that expand requirements for regulatory impact assessments.
A. The Lack of Empirical Support for Critics’ Claims Against NEPA
Our findings negate much of the conventional wisdom promoted by critics of NEPA. In
conjunction with data on NEPA compliance, we find that the vast majority of agencies decisions
that have the potential to significantly impact the environment require only perfunctory review
under CEs or relatively streamlined reviews under EAs; in comparison, the number of EISs
prepared is tiny and has been gradually declining over the last decade or so.176 The number of
cases filed under NEPA has remained relatively constant, with about 100 cases filed in district
courts annually (about 35 percent of which settle) and roughly 25 appeals. Given that the number
of federal actions potentially subject to NEPA is roughly 100 thousand or so annually,177
litigation rates are exceedingly low; even among actions requiring EISs, which pose the greatest
potential threats to the environment, on average 20 percent are challenged178 and just 13 percent
are actually litigated.179
These numbers represent national averages that obscure the highly skewed nature of
NEPA litigation that this and previous studies have exposed. For most federal agencies, a NEPA
lawsuit is a rare event and claims that NEPA poses a significant burden have little basis in fact.
176

See also Karkkainen, supra note 7, at 348 (characterizing the number of federal actions each year that trigger EIS
preparation duties “a vanishingly small number given the scale and scope of federal operations”).
177
See infra Part I.A.
178
See J. CLARENCE DAVIES & JAN MAZUREK, POLLUTION CONTROL IN THE UNITED STATES: EVALUATING THE
SYSTEM (2014) (“The percentage of EISs challenged in court has remained relatively stable, . . . fluctuating between
15 and 20 percent of all EISs filed.”).
179
See infra Part I.A.
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For the subset of federal land and natural resource management agencies that account for threequarters of the NEPA cases filed, the implications are more mixed. The rates of litigation relative
to the number of EISs prepared by these agencies (see Table 1 above) suggest that litigation rates
are roughly proportional to covered federal actions for the BLM, substantially lower for the
USACE, and to varying degrees substantially higher for the USFS, FWS, and NMFS. However,
if we apply the national averages, a little more than 25 percent of EISs issued by the USFS are
challenged and 18 percent are actually litigated. These percentages are significant particularly as
the total number of cases filed against the USFS averages about 35 each year. In the case of the
FWS and NMFS, the litigation rates are higher but the total number of EISs is low (averaging
just 8 and 3 EISs per year, respectively). Thus, in absolute terms, the burden from NEPA for
either of these agencies, particularly considering parallel requirements under the Endangered
Species Act,180 is not likely to be significant. Taken together, given the small percentage of
actions for which agencies prepare time-intensive EISs, in practice only the USFS is subject to a
volume of NEPA litigation that raises the potential for substantial added administrative burdens
on the agency.181
The low frequency and implied selectivity of NEPA litigation are reflected in the relative
success of environmental plaintiffs. Environmental organizations prevailed at consistently higher
rates than other plaintiffs filing NEPA actions, and their success in court was comparable to or
exceeded that of plaintiffs generally in administrative challenges.182 By these benchmarks, the
merits of NEPA challenges filed by environmental plaintiffs are inconsistent with claims that
NEPA suits are filed merely to hold up agency action and lack legitimate legal grounds. The high
success rates of environmental plaintiffs, who prevailed in about 45 percent of their cases during
the Bush Administration, is further evidence countering the charge that they used NEPA for
purely strategic objectives. To the extent that NEPA is used purely to hold up government action,
one would expect this tactic to occur more frequently with administrations less committed to
environmentally conscientious compliance with NEPA and CEQ mandates. Yet, we observe just
the opposite—on average, the merits of NEPA claims were substantially stronger during the
Bush Administration.
A principal reason that NEPA has not overburdened agencies is that the CEQ regulations
authorize agencies to tailor the level of environmental review to the nature of the action and its
likely effects. The courts have endorsed this approach by allowing agencies to determine, subject
to arbitrary and capricious review,183 whether a proposal requires an EA or an EIS184 or is
appropriately covered by a CE.185 NEPA procedures, therefore, are calibrated according to the
likelihood that a proposal will have significant environmental impacts. This approach has
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The Endangered Species Act requires agencies proposing to take actions that are likely to jeopardize listed
species or adversely modify their critical habitat to consult with other the FWS or NMFS in the preparation of a
biological opinion that recommends less damaging alternatives. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2012). A finding of a lesser
likelihood of jeopardy or adverse modification can justify the preparation of less comprehensive documentation.
181
The USFS’s expanded use of CEs since the mid-2000s may mitigate these burdens, particularly in light of how
rarely CEs are challenged; however, the USFS must be careful not to abuse this option. deWitt, supra note 64, at
172; Native Ecosystems Council v. Weldon, 2016 WL 4591897, at *2 (D. Mont. 2016) (observing that a CE “is not
an ‘escape NEPA free’ card”).
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See note 143.
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5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
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40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.4, 1508.13 (2016).
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Id. § 1508.4.
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succeeded, in significant part, because environmental plaintiffs have limited resources and are
constrained by countervailing political considerations. These realities strictly limit environmental
groups to filing cases with compelling facts or the potential to set valuable precedent for NEPA
procedures beyond the specifics of the particular case.
B. The Interplay of Presidential Politics and Judicial Ideology
Our most important findings expose the mechanisms by which structural elements of the
federal judiciary mediate the influence of partisan politics on judicial review across presidential
administrations. They also provide a consistent explanation for why judicial ideology is a
significant independent factor at the district court level, whereas its influence is more complex at
the appellate level. Our principal conclusions are twofold: (1) the alignment or misalignment of
presidential politics with a statute’s mandate has a substantial impact on the stringency of
judicial review; and (2) the number of cases in a circuit, the balance of conservative and liberal
ideologies among appellate judges on a circuit, and the statistics of appellate panels can heighten
or moderate the influence of ideology at the appellate level. To our knowledge, this is the first
time that the influence of presidential politics and these types of circuit effects have been
documented.
We observe two striking patterns in case outcomes across the Bush and Obama
Administrations. First, plaintiffs prevailed at much higher rates during the Bush Administration
than the Obama Administration at both the district court (39 versus 20 percent, respectively) and
appellate levels (28 versus 16 percent, respectively). Second, the influence of judicial ideology
was much greater during the Bush Administration. This is clearly evident in the district court and
appellate data, but the degree of convergence was more dramatic at the appellate level. The
difference in plaintiff success rates between Democratic- and Republican-appointed district
judges declined from 17 to 10 percent across the two administrations versus, at the appellate
level, a drop from 20 to 2 percent between majority Democratic- and majority Republicanappointed panels across the two administrations.186 Importantly, this change cannot be attributed
to variation in plaintiffs filing cases, as this convergence is not observed in the subsets of cases
with exclusively either environmental or non-environmental plaintiffs.187 Both of these changes,
one absolute and the other relative, highlight the influence of presidential politics and circuit
effects on judicial review. The latter relative change is of particular importance, however,
because it exposes changes in judicial deference across the two administrations that cannot be
explained by differences in the characteristics of the cases.188
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During the Bush Administration, the difference in plaintiff success rates between Democrat- and Republicanappointed district judges was 17 percent (48 and 31 percent, respectively) versus 10 percent (24 and 14 percent,
respectively) during the Obama Administration. At the appellate level, during the Bush Administration the
difference in plaintiff success rates between majority Democrat- and majority Republican-appointed panels was 20
percent (38 and 17 percent, respectively) versus 2 percent (17 and 15 percent, respectively) during the Obama
Administration.
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In the case of the environmental plaintiffs, the split between Democratic- and Republican-appointed judges in
rates at which plaintiffs prevailed remained static at 13 percent, whereas for non-environmental plaintiffs it
remained static at roughly 6 percent.
188
If only the population of cases were changing, the success rates of plaintiffs might change but this alone could
not affect differences based on judicial ideology.
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Despite the dramatic shifts in case outcomes across administrations, the influence of the
presidential administration is not a statistically significant factor at the appellate level, unlike the
district court sampler. We believe the explanation for this result centers on the alignment of the
statutory mandate of NEPA with the politics of the presidential administration and the
ideological commitments of the judge(s) hearing each case. As one of the leading federal
environmental statutes, NEPA is closely associated with liberal Democratic goals, which in the
current era of political polarization conflict with conservative Republican orthodoxy. The liberal
policies of NEPA processes create the potential for judicial ideology to be split between, neutral
towards, or in alignment with the party politics of the administration in power and the statutory
mandate of NEPA.
It is easiest to understand this dynamic through four basic scenarios reflected in our data,
namely, cases filed during each administration with either Democratic- or Republican-appointed
judges. Starting with the Bush Administration, Republican judges were sympathetic to the
Administration and unsympathetic to the liberal goals of NEPA (both factors aligning against
environmental plaintiffs), whereas Democratic judges were sympathetic to the goals of NEPA
but unsympathetic to the Administration (both factors aligning in favor of environmental
plaintiffs). By contrast during the Obama administration, Republican judges were unsympathetic
to NEPA’s goals and to the Administration (both factors essentially neutral towards
environmental plaintiffs), whereas Democratic judges were sympathetic to both (one factor
favoring and the other opposing environmental plaintiffs). As a consequence, the ideological
commitments of the judges are either split between the parties or neutral towards them, which
diminishes the influence of judicial ideology.
These four scenarios apply to district court judges who hear cases on their own but they
do not reflect the more complex interactions between judges that occur on appellate panels.
Individually, we expect ideological alignment to have a similar impact on circuit judges but our
regression in Table 3 indicates that the direct influence of ideology is obscured when judges hear
cases as three-judge panels. The ideological makeup of circuit panels alone was not statistically
significant in our regressions, and yet we observe a dramatic convergence in the rates at which
plaintiffs prevailed between panels with majority Democratic- and majority Republicanappointed judges during the Obama Administration. We infer from this that the interplay
between presidential politics and judicial ideology in appeals is statistically significant only
when case outcomes are aggregated at the Circuit level.
This observation raises the question of what circuit-level attributes mediate the interplay
of presidential politics and judicial ideology. We believe that three mutually reinforcing factors
are important—all of which center on the Ninth Circuit, which is both an “outlier” relative to
other circuits and a dominant venue in its own right. Two of the factors are straightforward,
namely, the large number of NEPA cases filed in the Ninth Circuit and the roughly 60- to 40percent split between Democratic- and Republican-appointed appellate judges in the Circuit. The
third factor concerns the combinatorics of three-judge panels and how it amplifies the impact of
the first two factors. In essence, because most circuits have very few NEPA appeals and
ideologically uniform panels are relatively rare (about 12 percent of the cases), the Ninth Circuit
for statistical reasons alone should account for roughly half of the all-Democratic-appointee
panels. Add to this the skew of the Ninth Circuit towards Democratic-appointed judges and it is
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unsurprising that the Ninth Circuit accounted for 83 percent of the appellate panels nationally
with exclusively Democratic-appointed judges.
These three factors generate significant circuit-level effects in the Ninth Circuit for two
reasons. First, ideologically homogeneous panels, as reflected in our data and other studies, tend
to be most influenced by ideology because each judge’s predilections are reinforced rather than
tempered by their colleagues.189 Second, there may be strength in numbers at the circuit level
that gives judges in the majority greater sway on panels, which we find evidence for in the
relatively high success rates of environmental plaintiffs before ideologically mixed panels in the
Ninth Circuit. Structural, circuit-level reasons therefore exist for judicial ideology to have an
outsized influence on the outcomes of appellate cases in the Ninth Circuit that do not apply to
other circuits. Further, we expect this ideological bias to filter down to district court judges
through precedent and their risk aversion to being overturned on appeal. This inference is
consistent with the relatively high success rates of plaintiffs at the district court level in the Ninth
Circuit, which cannot be attributed to the ideology of individual judges because, unlike the
appellate judges, they are evenly split between Democratic and Republican appointees.
The significance of the higher success rates of environmental plaintiffs and defendant
appellees is more difficult to reduce to a simple explanation. We cannot rule out a combination
of selection effects, ideological alignment, or superior litigation strategy. It could be that
environmental organizations are better at selecting cases and litigating them, or perhaps because
the interests of environmentalists naturally align with NEPA’s statutory mandate, judges tend to
favor them. We do not find any clear signals in the data—for example, one might expect local
environmental organizations to be less sophisticated in selecting and litigating cases, but we do
not observe any consistent evidence of this pattern in case outcomes. Similarly, the much higher
rates of success on appeal for defendant appellees is difficult to interpret due to the powerful
selection effects (meaning a very high bar to filing an appeal), and competing doctrines
regarding judicial deference to lower courts and the defendant agency. We suspect that both are
at play but, particularly given the small number of such cases in our sample, we must be
circumspect in the inferences that we draw.
The interaction we observe between presidential politics and judicial ideology at the
district court level is likely to apply beyond NEPA. However, empirical studies of judicial
review under other statutes, particularly those aligned ideologically with Republican politics,
must be conducted to substantiate this inference. The circuit-level effects we observe at the
appellate level are conditional—the degree to which they occur will depend on the distribution of
cases across circuits and the balance of Democratic- and Republican-appointed judges in each
circuit. Litigation under NEPA, fortuitously, provides a context in which circuit-level effects
were magnified by the disproportionate share of cases and the substantial majority of
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The statistics for the four combinations of judges on an appellate panel are as follows: (1) all cases in the sample
– plaintiffs prevailed on at least one claim in 8% of the cases before an all Republican panel, 17% before a panel of
two Republicans and 1 Democrat, 26% before two Democrats and one Republican, and 39% before an all Democrat
panel; (2) Bush Administration – plaintiffs prevailed on at least one claim in 5% of the cases before an all
Republican panel, 20% before a panel of two Republicans and 1 Democrat, 42% before two Democrats and one
Republican, and 41% before an all Democrat panel; (3) Obama Administration – plaintiffs prevailed on at least one
claim in 12% of the cases before an all Republican panel, 13% before a panel of two Republicans and 1 Democrat,
9% before two Democrats and one Republican, and 36% before an all Democrat panel.
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Democratic-appointed appellate judges in the Ninth Circuit. For example, while we would expect
to observe similar results for other natural resource statutes, such as the Endangered Species Act
and the National Forest Management Act, the necessary preconditions may or may not exist for
other environmental laws or statutes in other areas of law. This study demonstrates that circuitlevel effects can significantly impact case outcomes and should be factored into our
understanding of how the circuit structure of the judiciary and the ideological balance of judges
within circuits affect judicial review of agency action.
The interplay of presidential politics and judicial ideology we observe suggests several
subsidiary inferences. First, the influence of judicial ideology on district court cases will be
greater when the mandate of a statute is misaligned with the politics of the presidential
administration, but the degree to which judicial review provides a valid check on executive
action will turn on the number of judges with ideological commitments in alignment with the
mandate of the governing statute. Second, the circuit-level effects we observe will be greatest
when one or a small number of circuits account for a disproportionate share of the cases litigated
under a statute. Whether this set of conditions skews outcomes in a liberal or conservative
direction, and how far, will depend on the balance of Democratic- and Republican-appointed
appellate judges on the circuit(s). Conversely, if cases are distributed relatively uniformly across
circuits, perhaps due to geographic factors or the absence of forum shopping, circuit-level effects
will be weak or disappear. These insights also provide new grounds for understanding the special
status of the Ninth Circuit. Our findings suggest that the Ninth Circuit cannot be reduced to the
ideological balance of its judges or its size; geographic and other factors that determine the
distribution of cases across circuits and the structure of appellate panels are of equal importance.
From a normative perspective, our data reveal that judicial ideology is not bad per se. To
the contrary, it has the potential to play a valuable role in checking executive branch actions
when presidential politics are misaligned with statutory mandates. The degree to which this
occurs will depend on the balance of Democratic- and Republican-appointed district judges
hearing the cases, as well as the alignment of their ideological commitments with the statutory
mandate at issue. In addition, the circuit-level effects we observed in the Ninth Circuit (driven by
the number of cases in the Circuit) can enhance the effective stringency of judicial review at the
appellate level. We have described the basic phenomena but it would be useful to model
systematically how it is likely to vary with the number of circuits in the federal system and their
relative size, both geographically and with respect to numbers of cases. The importance of these
factors also exposes the structural contingencies of judicial oversight and how they mediate the
influence of judicial ideology in administrative cases. In doing so, it enhances our understanding
of the institutional frameworks and political forces that shape the effectiveness of the checks and
balances provided by an independent judiciary.
C. The Asymmetries of Environmental and Economic Review Statutes
NEPA has served as a model for economic regulatory review statutes and executive
orders premised on ensuring that the relationship between the economic costs and benefits of
regulations is adequately considered.190 The politics surrounding the economics of regulation
have escalated under the Trump Administration and current Congress, which together are taking
190

See GLICKSMAN & LEVY, supra note 14, at 381-82.
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regulatory reform to an extreme. The Regulatory Accountability Act (RAA), pending legislation
which has bipartisan support in Congress, exemplifies this trend. It incorporates an array of
procedures for conducting economic analyses and provides broad rights of administrative and
judicial review.191 Substantively, if the bill were adopted, agencies would have to ensure that,
with limited exceptions, they adopt “the most cost-effective rule that . . . meets relevant statutory
objectives.”192 Further, while the applicability of existing laws mandating economic impact
analyses is limited to “significant” or “major” rules,193 the RAA contains provisions that
implicate a far wider range of regulations.194
This new generation of regulatory review laws will prolong the six to eight years it
typically takes to complete a rulemaking,195 a process that can take much longer if a rule is
controversial.196 Although numerous factors contribute to the duration of rulemaking
processes,197 augmented economic review procedures are widely cited as a major contributing
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S. 951, 115th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(2) (to be codified at 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(f))). For example, the RAA affords
“interested persons” the right to petition an agency to hold a formal hearing on high-impact rules if “the proposed
rule is based on conclusions with respect to 1 or more specific scientific, technical, economic, or other complex
factual issues that are genuinely disputed” that would be likely to affect the costs and benefits of the rule or whether
it would achieve statutory purposes. Id. § 3(2) (to be codified at 5 U.S.C. § 553(e)(B)(i)).
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Id. (to be codified at 5 U.S.C. § 553(f)(1)(A)). Although many existing impact analysis requirements are purely
procedural, some important ones are not. See, e.g., Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, 2 U.S.C. § 1535(a) (requiring
agencies to “select the least costly, most cost-effective, or least burdensome alternative that achieves the objective or
the rule”); Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 1(b)(5), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993), supplemented by Exec. Order No.
13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011) (agencies must design regulations “in the most cost-effective manner to
achieve the regulatory objective”);.
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Major rules are typically defined as those expected to generate expenditures or have an impact of $100 million or
more each year on the economy. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,866, §§ 6(a)(3)(C), 3(f); 2 U.S.C. § 1532(a) (2012).
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The bill encompasses regulations that are likely to cause “significant adverse effects on competition,
employment, investment, productivity, innovation, public health and safety, or the ability of United States-based
enterprises to compete with foreign-based enterprises in domestic and export markets.” S. 951, § 2(5) (to be codified
at 5 U.S.C. § 551(18)(C)) (major rules). Other existing economic assessment requirements are similarly subject to
multiple triggers. Executive Order 12,866’s definition of a “significant regulatory action,” for example, includes
rules that “[c]reate a serious inconsistency or otherwise interfere with an action taken or planned by another
agency,” “[m]aterially alter the budgetary impact of entitlements, grants, user fees, or loan program or the rights and
obligations of recipients thereof,” or raise novel legal or policy questions arising out of legal mandates, presidential
priorities or the Order’s priorities. Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 3(f). See also Congressional Research Serv., Counting
Regulations: An Overview of Rulemaking, Types of Federal Regulations, and Pages in the Federal Register,
R43056, at 8 (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43056.pdf; 5 U.S.C. § 603(a) (2012) (the RFA applies to every
rule subject to notice and comment rulemaking); 44 U.S.C. § 3507(d) (2012) (the PRA applies to requirements to
collect information contained in a proposed and final rule); 44 U.S.C. § 351(2012) (the Information Quality Act
(IQA) applies to “information disseminated by Federal agencies”).
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Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Rulemaking Ossification Is Real: A Response to Testing the Ossification Thesis, 80 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1493, 1496 (2012).
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See Sidney Shapiro, Elizabeth Fisher & Wendy Wagner, The Enlightenment of Administrative Law: Looking
Inside the Agency for Legitimacy, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 463, 464 (2012) (arguing that as a result of rulemaking
ossification, “important and controversial rules usually take five or more years to make and sometimes even a
decade or longer”); Royal C. Gardner, Public Participation and Wetlands Regulation, 10 U.C.L.A. J. ENVTL. L. &
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See Connor Raso, Agency Avoidance of Rulemaking Procedures, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 65, 109 (2015) (highlighting
“four problems: 1) analytic requirements imposed by Congress . . .; 2) analytic requirements imposed by the White
House; 3) congressional review; and 4) judicial review.”).
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factor.198 The pending RAA contains provisions that appear to be specifically designed to burden
rulemaking processes further by, for example, affording “interested persons” the right to petition
an agency to hold a formal “public hearing” that includes lengthy witness testimony and crossexamination199 for high-impact rules.200 These provisions would not only add procedures widely
viewed as unnecessary and counterproductive; they would also establish broad criteria for
triggering cumbersome hearing procedures. Essentially, any issue implicating genuinely disputed
complex factual questions that could affect a rule’s costs and benefits or whether it achieves the
applicable statutory purposes could be grounds requiring an agency to grant a petition for a
formal public hearing.201
Beyond the addition of more elaborate and formal processes, these economic review laws
differ from NEPA in other ways. NEPA procedures differ from the new regulatory review laws
by incorporating flexible frameworks that afford agencies broad discretion to determine the level
of environmental review required; as we have seen, the scope of NEPA analyses vary widely and
most entail abridged assessments under CEs and EAs rather than full-blown EISs. Neither the
executive orders nor the existing economic review legislation contain frameworks for
abbreviated assessments analogous to NEPA’s CEs or EAs, such as a mechanism analogous to
NEPA’s mitigated FONSI that allows an agency to soften the economic impact to avoid rigorous
impact analysis requirements. Under the RFA, for example, regulatory flexibility analyses follow
one-size-fits-all procedures and criteria,202 and the same is true of the cost-benefit analyses under
the key executive orders203 and other existing statutes.204 The pending RAA adopts a similar
approach but with far more extensive procedures. Without the tailoring mechanisms that have
evolved under NEPA, economic review laws are far more likely to increase the costs and
duration of agency rulemaking, and ample evidence exists that they already do205 and that
statutes such as the RAA will exacerbate these problems.206
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See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385,
1404-05 (1992); Jeffrey S. Lubbers, The Transformation of the U.S. Rulemaking Process-for Better or Worse, 34
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imposed by executive orders such as Executive Order 12,866); but cf. Raso, supra note 197, at 110 (arguing that
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S. 951, 115th Cong. 1st Sess. § 3(2) (to be codified at 5 U.S.C. § 553(e)(3)(B)(iii)(III)).
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Id. § 3(2) (to be codified at 5 U.S.C. § 553(e)(1)(A), (C)(i)).
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202
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605(b).
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E.g., Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 6(a)(3)(C). The Order does allow for truncated procedures “[i]n emergency
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6(a)(3)(D).
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2 U.S.C. §§ 1532-1536 (2012).
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This flexibility is of particular importance because NEPA has taken on a “quasiconstitutional status”207 that some commentators have likened to a “super statute” because its
institutional and normative principles have become so broadly influential.208 In the present
context, this status is important because judges are more likely to construe and apply NEPA in a
manner that limits agency discretion when it has the potential to subvert NEPA’s goals.209 Since
NEPA’s passage, courts have demonstrated a distinctive willingness to intervene when agencies
give NEPA procedures short shrift.210 Over time the RAA, and other economic review statutes,
have the potential to be viewed as similarly foundational, much as they already do with the APA,
and this posture could lead courts to subject agency compliance to a heightened level of scrutiny
that would limit agency discretion and further encourage challenges to agency rules. In addition,
while the RAA and other regulatory impact statutes contain substantive provisions, this elevated
status could erode the greater deference judges afford substantive agency decisions.211
To date, the added costs and delays associated with legal challenges to agency
compliance with economic review statutes212 and executive orders213 have been largely avoided
207
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placing procedural, rather than substantive, limitations on legislatively authorized programs.”); Perry A. Zirkel,
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aff’d in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 421 F.3d 618 (8th Cir. 2005) (review is unavailable because IQA
requirements are committed to agency discretion by law for purposes of 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2)).
213
See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,563, § 7(d), 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011) (stating that the Order does not
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No. 12,866, § 10, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993) (same).
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because they either preclude or strictly limit judicial review.214 The RAA, however, departs from
the narrow grants of judicial review found in existing regulatory review laws. It gives litigants
the right to challenge the scope and substance of an economic impact statement,215 as well as
other specific procedural requirements,216 and similar to NEPA,217 courts would have the
authority to remand a rule back to the agency to cure procedural or substantive defects.218 The
RAA therefore would make judicial challenges freely available to an unprecedented degree.
Together the structural differences between NEPA and the economic review laws raise
the specter that the conditions responsible for facilitating efficient compliance with NEPA and
constraining litigation will be eroded or absent, creating both legal and practical concerns. First,
as described above, NEPA is calibrated in a way that the RAA and other statutes are not.
Whereas NEPA has three tiers of environmental reviews, existing and proposed economic
review laws have a single tier that encompasses a broad range of federal actions.219 In addition,
while practical or strategic considerations limit challenges to invocation of a CE or reliance on
an EA for small-scale projects under NEPA, this is not necessarily true of regulatory reviews. In
particular, because economic reviews often center on impacts concentrated on regulated entities,
as opposed to the diffuse public benefits associated with environmental measures that may result
from NEPA compliance, the economic stakes are much more likely to justify incurring the high
costs of a judicial challenge.
Second, the resources of the industry litigants most likely to file legal challenges under
statutes like the RAA are vastly greater than those of the environmental organizations that
dominate litigation under NEPA. Large regulated entities subject to major regulations will also
have powerful profit-based incentives to challenge major regulations, even if only to delay their
effective date. Similarly, although small businesses are less likely to have the resources to file
suits on a routine basis, they can spread costs through suits by other businesses that may benefit
them or rely on trade associations or entities like the U.S. Chamber of Commerce with sufficient
resources to file lawsuits. In either case, whether by virtue of individual scale or collective
pooling, the economic constraints on filing legal challenges under economic review laws are
dramatically less than those for NEPA.
Third, if the courts follow the lead of the Supreme Court in the Clean Power Plan (CPP)
litigation by liberally granting injunctive relief at an early stage of litigation, the economic and
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Even when direct review of augmented procedures is not available, however, the documents they generate
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The PRA, for example, applies to requirements to collect information contained in a proposed and final rule. 44
U.S.C. § 3507(d) (2012). The IQA applies to “information disseminated by Federal agencies.” Pub. L. No. 106-554,
§ 515(b) (2000) (codified at 44 U.S.C. § 3516 note).
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strategic incentives for bringing challenges under the RAA will be enhanced. The Court in that
case stayed EPA’s regulations restricting greenhouse gas emissions from existing power plants
before any lower court had the opportunity to address the merits, and it did so without
explanation.220 By contrast, the Court has sent a clear signal that lower courts have been too
lenient in granting injunctions under NEPA and admonished them to ratchet up the showing
needed to demonstrate irreparable injury.221 Predictably, the CPP stay has prompted regulated
entities to seek stays of other Clean Air Act regulations while litigation is pending. If that
strategy succeeds, it would only be a matter of time before economic interests make similar
arguments under a statute like the RAA.
Fourth, the interplay of presidential politics and the mandates of regulatory review laws
will be a major factor in determining the effective stringency of judicial oversight and the impact
of litigation. The requirements for economic assessments found in regulatory reform statutes
reflect a largely partisan Republican ideology, suggesting that judicial review of agency
compliance will be most common, and potentially disruptive, during Democratic administrations
that believe government regulation serves important objectives even if it has significant
economic impacts in the regulated sectors. Under such circumstances, when tensions exist
between statutory goals and presidential priorities, the framework from Part III.B. predicts that
judicial ideology will have a substantially greater impact on the outcome of legal challenges.
However, as we have shown, the degree to which judicial ideology is a factor will depend on the
distribution of cases across circuits and the ideological balance within them.
In the case of the economic review laws, different factors could moderate or escalate the
influence of judicial ideology. A potentially moderating factor is the broad range of rules and
agency decisions likely to be subject to legal challenge under statutes like the RAA. Economic
impacts are both more generic and less geographically bounded than environmental ones, and
important classes of environmental regulations exempted from NEPA, such as Clean Air Act
regulations, will be high-profile targets under economic review laws. This lack of constraints has
the potential to distribute cases across a broader range of circuits than the handful that have
dominated under NEPA. That distribution would tend to mitigate the influence of judicial
ideology because nationally Democratic- and Republican-appointed judges are evenly balanced.
On the other hand, if the absence of constraints liberates plaintiffs to forum shop, it could
concentrate cases in the most conservative circuits. Thus, while the enhanced influence of liberal
judicial ideology in NEPA litigation was driven by the geographic overlap of federal public lands
and endangered species issues in the Ninth Circuit, the degree to which judicial ideology plays a
role in the implementation of economic review laws is likely to be much more within the control
of plaintiffs’ lawyers.
The sources of concern noted above—the binary nature of regulatory reviews laws, the
incentives and far greater resources of business plaintiffs, and the recent move towards granting
strategically valuable early injunctive relief to regulated entities—along with a long history of
industry opposition to government regulation all suggest that business interests will use litigation
aggressively. They also highlight the contingencies and precariousness of judicial ideology
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Basin Elec. Power Co-op. v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 998 (2016). For discussion of the unprecedented nature of the stay
decision, see Lisa Heinzerling, The Supreme Court’s Clean-Power Power Grab, 28 GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 425, 425
(2016).
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Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008).
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playing a constructive role in judicial review of agency action. Reasonable people will differ
over whether the stringency of judicial oversight of the Bush Administration’s compliance with
NEPA was appropriate, or even whether the relatively non-ideological level of judicial review
during the Obama Administration represents an appropriate benchmark. Our understanding of
the policies during both administrations leads us to believe that the disparities in judicial
oversight are justifiable and provide an example of judicial ideology playing a constructive role,
but we recognize that this view cannot be separated from a variety of normative judgments about
the role and importance of NEPA.
We nevertheless believe that there are important structural constraints on environmental
plaintiffs, and plaintiffs generally who represent diffuse public interests, that limit recourse to the
courts and the impact of judicial ideology on agency action. These resource and institutional
constraints force such plaintiffs to be more selective in the cases they file, making it more likely
for their claims to align with the purposes and requirements of the law, and reduce the potential
for judicial overreach simply by virtue of the modest numbers of cases filed. However, both of
these constraints are relaxed when the plaintiffs are regulated entities challenging regulations that
impose substantial costs on them. This dynamic, along with the much greater potential for forum
shopping under the new generation of economic review laws, expose the stark asymmetries
between them and NEPA. In short, the combination of legal and practical constraints that have
mediated judicial review under NEPA will be either eroded or absent under regulatory review
statutes such as the RAA. It is no small irony that the objections critics have leveled against
NEPA—wasteful and costly delays in government actions driven by parochial interests—are far
more likely to occur under the economic review statutes they are advocating.222 We hope that
legal commentators and legislators across the political spectrum will appreciate that these
statutes pose not only a threat to agency decisionmaking, but also to the legitimacy of judicial
oversight because it has a much greater potential to exploit and exacerbate the influence of
judicial ideology.
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At the same time that the Trump Administration and Republican congressional majorities have championed
enhanced economic impact review requirements, they have supported narrowing the scope of NEPA mandates or
exempting activities such as infrastructure development production from NEPA altogether. See, e.g.. Exec. Order
No. 13,766, Expediting Environmental Reviews and Approvals for High Priority Infrastructure Projects, 82 Fed.
Reg. 13,766 (Jan. 24, 2017); H.R. 1654, Water Supply Permitting Coordination Act, § 4(b)(4), 115 th Cong. (20172018) (mandating expedited NEPA review of proposed water storage projects); see also Nationwide Conservative
Groups: Promote Fiscal Responsibility in Upcoming Transportation and Infrastructure Spending (May 11, 2017),
https://v6mx3476r2b25580w4eit4uv-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wpcontent/uploads/2017/05/Transpo_Coalition_FINAL.pdf (letter to members of Congress from conservative
organizations criticizing “[l]engthy and often duplicative environmental impact studies [that] increase project costs
and drag project timelines,” and suggesting reforms such as “the removal of greenhouse gas emissions from the
review process and limiting the scope and application of [NEPA] as well as other planning and analysis mandates”
to “save
time and reallocate limited tax dollars from paperwork and red tape to asphalt and concrete”). President Trump has
pledged to create an office within CEQ to speed infrastructure projects by eliminating “outdated federal rules” such
as the permitting processes that slowed approval of the Keystone XL and Dakota Access pipelines. See Camille von
Kaenel, Trump decries ‘painful’ permitting, bulky enviro reviews, GREENWIRE, June 9, 2017,
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060055833.

47

IV. Conclusion
Our study of district and appellate court NEPA decisions demonstrates that, contrary to
the assessments of NEPA’s critics, the statute’s procedural requirements rarely delay policies or
projects. Judicial review is also found to be calibrated, such that the influence of judicial
ideology, and the degree of scrutiny, varies with the ideological alignment of presidential politics
and the statutory mandate under review. This dynamic is mediated by the distribution of cases
across circuits and the ideological balance of judges within them; at base, it is driven by
rudimentary statistics that determine the number of ideologically homogeneous appellate panels
in a circuit. We find that, under a well-defined range of conditions, judicial ideology can play a
constructive role in ensuring that agencies comply with statutory mandates and judicial checks
can be most robust precisely when the risk of statutory subversion is greatest—that is when the
ideology of the administration is in tension with a statutory mandate.
A comparison of NEPA with the expanding array of legal mandates that prescribe
elaborate economic impact analyses illustrate the normative and practical implications of these
observations. The raft of executive orders issued by the Trump Administration and new
legislation pending in Congress have elevated the importance and potential impacts on agency
decisionmaking of augmented economic reviews. The interplay we identify between presidential
politics and judicial review provides new grounds for concern that, unlike NEPA, these policies
have a much greater potential to disrupt and delay agency decisionmaking processes. Further
empirical study of judicial review under a range of statutes is needed to determine how broadly
these findings apply to administrative review challenges in general.
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Appendix: Description of Empirical Methods and Protocols
From an empirical standpoint, collecting data on NEPA cases is facilitated by their
procedural simplicity. NEPA cases follow a foreshortened series of steps—transmittal of the
administrative record to the court; filing of cross motions for injunctive relief, dismissal, or
summary judgment. While settlement, abandonment, or a procedural defect may shortcut the
process and minor variations in procedural timelines may occur (e.g., motions to stay cases
pending external events), most NEPA cases are resolved on motions for summary judgment.
Further, because administrative challenges are based largely, and typically exclusively, on
administrative records, district court proceedings are not burdened by drawn-out discovery
battles. A judge’s primary task is to evaluate the administrative record from the federal agency,
the relevant legal authorities, and the arguments of the parties to determine whether to affirm or
reverse the agency, in whole or part, and where a defect is found to grant injunctive relief or
remand the case to the federal agency for further consideration.
These procedural virtues are complemented by the relative simplicity and linguistic
idiosyncrasies of NEPA claims. In particular, the distinctive legal terms associated with NEPA
claims enable automated coding of cases and facilitate hand coding with few potential sources of
ambiguity. Together, these characteristics make NEPA litigation a particularly attractive subject
for empirical study.
A. NEPA Litigation Study Design and Methods
We adopted a two-part strategy for determining how we would code the cases.223 First,
we coded a sample of about 200 district court cases at a high level of granularity (data on
roughly 60 claims and subclaims were collected) to gain a rough assessment of the key variables
and to determine which claims had the potential to generate meaningful statistics. As a
complement to this sample, we used the NVivo software to auto code about 1,580 district court
and 585 circuit court opinions224 drawn from the Westlaw federal courts database that referred to
NEPA from 2001 through 2015.225 This coding evaluated the frequency of specialized legal
terms used in NEPA claims and thus provided a complementary measure of the rates at which
specific NEPA claims were raised.226 We also conducted numerous Chi2 and regression analyses
223

Our data collection followed the principles of study design in the ICPSR Guide to Social Science Data
Preparation and Archiving (5th ed., 2012) and the recommendations of recent legal scholarship. See Pauline T. Kim
et al., How Should We Study District Judge Decision-Making?, 29 J. LAW & POL. 83, 83-84 (2009).
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For both the district court and circuit court cases, we compiled a large database of cases using the search-term
phrase “National Environmental Policy Act” in the Westlaw “Federal Cases” database. This generated 1,967 district
cases and 842 circuit court cases. From these cases, we culled cases in which at least one substantive NEPA claim
was raised (e.g., a challenge to a categorical exclusion or to the alternatives in environmental assessment); this
second round of coding generated the 1,579 district court and 584 circuit court cases. Random samples were then
taken for each database for use in hand coding of cases.
225
We used the Westlaw database for All Federal Cases. Cases were selected based on whether they included the
phrase “National Environmental Policy Act.” This was purposefully over-inclusive and cases were subsequently
culled based on more precise studies of their content. There is an apparent lag in the time that its takes district court
cases to be added to the Westlaw database, which is evident in the low numbers of cases for 2015 and particularly
2016.
226
In a subset of these cases, we were able to use the automated coding to determine whether the plaintiff or federal
defendants prevailed. These cases provided a very efficient means of assessing the relative success of different types
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to determine which variables would be included in the larger study. Together, this preliminary
work enabled us to identify ten variables for which data would be collected in the larger sample
of 498 district court cases and 334 circuit court cases.
The sample data included information on the court and judge, parties to the litigation, the
nature of the federal action, jurisdictional challenges, substantive challenges under NEPA, and
the timing of a case. The list below provides a general description of the range of data collected:


Court, judge, presidential administration (and party) that appointed the judge



Identity of parties to the litigation, classes of litigants (e.g., environmental
organization, individual, government, business)



Dates of court filings, motions, and opinions and duration of the litigation



Lead federal agency, other federal agencies (if any) involved in the NEPA process
and type of federal action (e.g., federal permit, funding, or direction action)



NEPA claims raised (e.g., adequacy of an environmental assessment), and
disposition of claims (e.g., dismissal, settlement, decision on the merits)



Nature of the relief (if any) provided by the court to successful plaintiffs (e.g.
remand to agency, preliminary or permanent injunction)

The study data were drawn from three separate sources: (1) the federal judiciary’s
“Public Access to Court Electronic Records” (PACER) database, which contains case docket
information and court filings dating back to roughly 2000;227 (2) the Westlaw database of
published and unpublished federal court opinions;228 and (3) the Attributes of U.S. Federal
Judges Database compiled under the Judicial Research Initiative at the University of South
Carolina.229 In addition, we obtained a database from the Council on Environmental Quality
(CEQ) with partially coded NEPA cases for the periods 2000-2009 and 2012-2014.230 The CEQ
data were particularly valuable because they contain cases settled or dismissed prior to a court
decision on the merits; without this case information, it would have been exceedingly difficult to
identify such cases given the limitations of the PACER and Westlaw databases. Unfortunately,
because of inconsistencies in the case-coding methods, we ultimately did not use this database.
Use of several databases was essential because it enabled us to collect a large sample of
unpublished opinions, which numerous studies have shown can differ from published decisions
of NEPA claims, but this analysis is incomplete because it presumes (incorrectly) that all NEPA claims rise and fall
together. Because of this, any associations observed are likely to be real, but the absence of such associations does
not imply that none exist—as the lumping of claims together will obscure such associations.
227
The PACER database is available at https://www.pacer.gov/.
228
The Westlaw database for federal cases and opinions (All Federal Cases) is available at
https://lawschool.westlaw.com/.
229
The Judicial Research Initiative is available at http://artsandsciences.sc.edu/poli/juri/attributes.htm; we also
obtained information from the federal Judiciary site available at
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges.html.
230
The data were obtained through Horst Greczmeil, the Associate Director for NEPA Oversight at CEQ, which
oversees an annual NEPA litigation survey (available through https://ceq.doe.gov/legal_corner/litigation.html and
http://energy.gov/nepa/downloads/nepa-litigation-surveys).
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in systematic ways.231 Researchers have found, for example, that published district court
opinions are generally more “liberal” than unpublished ones, and that ideological influences are
greater in the former compared with the latter.232 The low rates at which judges actually rule on
cases filed in district courts exacerbate these selection biases. In 2006, for example, less than half
of the cases filed in district courts were resolved by some form of adjudication, with most of the
remaining cases either being abandoned or settled.233 Moreover, given that cases are unlikely to
settle randomly, fully litigated cases will not be representative of all the cases that are filed. The
presence of these selection effects demonstrates that studies limited to evaluating district court
opinions, especially if solely published opinions, will generate misleading or unrepresentative
results.
B. Descriptive Statistics for District and Circuit Court Cases
Table 4: Relative Frequency of Procedural and Supplemental Claims 2000-2015234
Categorical
Exclusion

Supplemental
EIS

Tiering

Constitutional
Standing

Prudential
Standing

Ripeness

Mootness

Exhaustion

Number
of Cases

205

250

88

642

91

166

141

119

Percent
All Cases

13%

15.8%

5.6%

40.7%

5.8%

10.5%

8.9%

7.5%

Median

2

3

2.5

3

2

2

3

2

11

14.5

8

21

11

10

12

6

th

90 %

231

See Evan Ringquist & Craig E. Emmert, Judicial Policymaking in Published and Unpublished Decisions: The
Case of Environmental Civil Litigation, 52 POL. RES. Q. 7 (1999); Michael Hannon, A Closer Look at Unpublished
Opinions in the United States Court of Appeals, 3 J. APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROC. 199 (2001); Denise M.
Keele, An Analysis of Ideological Effects in Published Versus Unpublished Judicial Opinions, 6 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUDIES 213 (2009); Peter Siegelman & John Donohue, Studying the Iceberg from Its Tip: A Comparison of
Published and Unpublished Employment Discrimination Cases, 24 L. & SOC. REV. 1133 (1990); Stephen Wasby
Unpublished Decisions in the Federal Courts of Appeals: Making the Decision to Publish, 3 J. APPELLATE
PRACTICE AND PROC. 325 (2001).
232
Keele, supra note 231, at 213-14.
233
Hoffman, supra note 140, at 682-82.
234
Note that the mean, median, and 90th percentile refer to the actual number of times that the specific claim is
referred in a case. For example, the 90th percentile indicates the number of times that the claim is references in this
top tier of cases. These data are based on the database of 1579 cases we compiled from the Westlaw database, 640 of
which are unpublished cases.
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Table 5: Relative Frequency of Environmental Assessment Claims 2000-2015235
Alternatives

Cumulative
Impacts

Mitigation

Indirect
Impacts

Uncertainty

Intensity

FONSI

Number of
Cases

355

278

162

119

87

71

683

Percent All
Cases

22.5%

17.6%

10.3%

7.5%

5.5%

4.5%

13.36%

Percent of
EA Claims

47.84%

37.47%

21.83%

16.04%

11.73%

9.57%

92.05%

Median

2

2.5

2

1

1

1

4

90th%

9

10

6

4

3

2

19

Table 6: Relative Frequency of Environmental Impact Statement Claims 2000-2015
Alternatives

Cumulative
Impacts

Mitigation

Scope

Indirect
Impacts

Uncertainty

Connected

Intensity

Number of
Cases

587

398

247

173

160

147

138

111

Percent
All Cases

37.2%

25.2%

15.6%

11.0%

10.1%

9.3%

8.74%

7.0%

Percent of
EIS Claims

72.83%

49.38%

30.65%

21.46%

19.85%

18.24%

17.12%

13.77%

Median

2

2

2

1

1

1

1

1

90th%

8

6

7

3

3

4

3

3

235

Claims based on “controversial actions” and “segmentation” were raised in less than 3 percent of the district
court cases and less than 7 percent of the district court cases in which challenges to EAs were raised.
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Table 7: Relative Frequency of Procedural and Supplemental Claims in Appeals236
stats
Number
of Cases
Percent
All Cases
Median
90th%

Categorical
Exclusion
47

Supplemental
EIS
93

Tiering

Prudential
Standing
30

Ripeness

Mootness

Exhaustion

30

Constitutional
Standing
219

56

57

35

8.05%

15.92%

5.14%

37.50%

5.14%

9.59%

9.76%

5.99%

2
11

3
11

3
7

3
23

3
8

3
10

4
9

1
7

Table 8: Relative Frequency of Environmental Assessment Claims in Appeals
stats

Alternatives

Number of
Cases

73

Cumulative
Impacts
67

Mitigation

Uncertainty

Intensity

FONSI

38

Indirect
Impacts
24

23

19

210

Percent
All Cases

12.50%

11.47%

6.51%

4.11%

3.94%

3.25%

35.96%

Percent of
EA Claims
Median
90th%

30.67%

28.15%

15.97%

10.08%

9.66%

7.98%

88.24%

2
9

2
8

2
8

1
4

1
2

1
3

4.5
14

Table 9: Relative Frequency of Environmental Impact Statement Claims in Appeals
Alternatives
Number of
Cases
Percent All
Cases
Percent of
EIS Claims
Median
90th%

236

Mitigation

208

Cumulative
Impacts
117

86

35.62%

20.03%

69.10%
2
9

Scope

Uncertainty

Intensity

Connected

79

Indirect
Impacts
41

53

33

32

14.73%

13.53%

7.02%

9.08%

5.65%

5.48%

38.87%

28.57%

26.25%

13.62%

17.61%

10.96%

10.63%

2
7

2
7

1
4

1
2

1
3

1
2

2
10

For the 584 appellate cases, 301 involved EIS claims and 238 involved EA claims.
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